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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE LAW V. THE STRANGER
LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL SPACE IN LEXINGTON, KY

This thesis examines the role of interpretation in legal encounter in Lexington,
Kentucky. Through an analysis of legal and interpretation practices, this study seeks to
ascertain how these practices may affect non-native or low-proficiency English speakers’
(LLPs) experiences with both federal and local laws and legal spaces. This place-based
study involves in-depth qualitative research. Using the methodological framework of
feminist geo-jurisprudence, this research contributes to our understanding of 1) the limits
of the publicity of legal space and, more specifically, the ways in which language barriers
can prevent legal inclusion; 2) local strategies and tactics for dealing with the challenges
to meaningful access before the law in terms of language as outlined by Title VI of the
1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act; 3) the broader implications of language access for
immigrants and non-citizens at the intersection of legal discourse and society (discursive
legal space). Furthermore, this research addresses the absence and presence of hospitality
(Derrida, 2005) from this site of citizenship negotiation, and it addresses the ethics of
hospitality behind the work that attempts to resist legal closure and to enforce laws that
protect, rather than persecute, those facing language barriers.
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The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
In order to know what it is, we must know what is has been, and what it tends to become. We
must alternatively consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor
will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage. The substance
of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then
understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depend very much upon its past.

-Justice Holmes, The Common Law
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I. INTRODUCTION
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY:
I M M I G R A T I O N A N D EN G L I S H LA N G U A G E P R O F I C I EN C Y ,

2000-2007

Lexington (Fayette County) is located in the Bluegrass Region of northern Kentucky.
In 2007, the city’s population was documented by the U.S. Census Bureau to be 279,044
persons. Within the last decade, Lexington and the greater Kentucky have experienced a
recent and rapid expansion in immigration. As reported by the Migration Policy Institute,
the foreign-born population in the state changed by 34.3 percent between 2000 and 2007,
with Mexican-born individuals (26.5 percent) comprising the majority, in 2007. These
changes can be attributed, in part, to the movement away from the traditional gateway
immigrant communities to places like Lexington, the “New South” (Winders, 2006),
where jobs in construction and light manufacturing are available and the cost of living is
lower compared to other parts of the country. As families begin to establish themselves
in “non-traditional settlement areas” (Migration Policy Institute) like Kentucky, these
connections and word-of-mouth draw others to the region. Kentucky, like other states in
the U.S. South, then, has witnessed transformations in its ethnic and racial composition,
including the growth of its Latino/a population.
In an increasingly globalizing world, the movement of bodies also entails the
movement and relocation of embodied languages. Between 2000 and 2007, the limited
English proficient (LEP) population age 5 and older in Kentucky increased by 41 percent
from 33,311 to 46,969 persons (“KY Fact Sheet”). In Kentucky, and elsewhere in the
U.S., non-English speakers or low-level English proficiency (LEP) individuals are mostly
foreign-born. In 2007, 44.3 percent of the state’s total foreign-born 5+ population were
LEP (ibid.); which is to say that these individuals were relying on a language other than
English in the practice of their everyday lives and affairs. According to the Migration
Policy Institute, rates of English proficiency varied depending on immigrant mother
tongues: “71.4 percent of those who spoke Spanish at home were LEP compared to 33.8
percent of those who spoke other Indo-European languages, 58.8 percent of those who
spoke Asian and Pacific Island languages, and 64.2 percent of those who spoke other
languages.”

Additionally, rates of English proficiency were reported higher for

naturalized citizens than noncitizens. This information is conveyed in the below table:
1

Table 1:
“Limited English Proficient (LEP) Populations by Citizenship Status, 2006”,
The Migration Policy Institute
Total Household Population of Kentucky, Age 5 and Older

3,929,110

Speak only English
Speak language other than English

95.9
4.1

Speak English “very well”

2.3

Speak English less than “very well” (LEP)

1.8
3,819,304

Native Born
Speak only English
Speak language other than English

98.0
2.0

Speak English “very well”

1.3

Speak English less than “very well” (LEP)

0.7
109,806

Foreign Born
Speak only English
Speak language other than English

24.5
75.5

Speak English “very well”

34.9

Speak English less than “very well” (LEP)

40.6
70,012

Noncitizen
Speak only English
Speak language other than English

17.7
82.3

Speak English “very well”

33.5

Speak English less than “very well” (LEP)

48.8
39,794

Naturalized Citizen
Speak only English
Speak language other than English

36.5
63.5

Speak English “very well”

37.2

Speak English less than “very well” (LEP)

26.3

Source: http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state2.cfm?ID=KY

If these state trends reflect transformations in Lexington, the state’s second largest
city, then, not only is the ‘face’ of Lexington experiencing changes, then, but so too is the
‘voice’ of the city. In this way, language is a direct implication of new migration flows
(Valentine, et al., 2008). As “New Americans” populate “New South” cities (Winders,
2006), new types of encounter arise. These encounters may catalyze in new or emerging
immigrant politics and discourses and lead to the formation of new identities, all of which
necessitate new ways of communicating. What are the relationships between language
and immigrant encounters?

How are these newer residents in the Lexington area
2

accessing the city’s resources and services, including legal services?
experiencing discrimination?

Are they

How, then, do language and immigration shape legal

encounter? In order to approach these questions, I consider the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
particularly Title VI of the Act, which involves access to federally-funded agencies and
services.

MEANINGFUL ACCESS:
T I T L E V I O F T H E 1964 C I V I L R I G H T S A C T

& 2001

EX E C U T I V E O R D E R

13166

“It ought to be possible, in short, for every American to enjoy the privileges
of being American without regard to his race or his color. In short, every
American ought to have the right to be treated as he would wish to be treated,
as one would wish his children to be treated. But this is not the case.”
-President John F. Kennedy, 11 June 1963

The 1964 Civil Rights Act resulted from a bill first brought before the United States
Congress by President John F. Kennedy in 1963. It was ratified the following year
during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson as the “Civil Rights Act”, after the end of a
Democratic filibuster. This piece of legislation, which was conceived to address African
American voting rights in the Deep South, was a monumental moment amidst the Civil
Rights Movement (approximately 1955-1968) in the U.S. In essence, the Civil Rights
Act provides the federal government with the legal leverage to enforce desegregation and
anti-discrimination policy. It prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and makes racial discrimination in public places illegal. It also requires
employers to provide equality in employment and resulted in the creation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. As a “prohibition against exclusion” Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 and its implementing regulations
provide that “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance” (“Title VI”).
The U.S. Government has termed those who lack English language skills as
individuals with “Limited Language Proficiency” (LLP), recognizing that, while most
individuals in the United States read, write, and speak English, there are many living and
3

working in this country for whom English is not their primary language. In the document
entitled, “Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - National Origin
Discrimination Against Persons With Limited English Proficiency” (referred to from here
on as "LLP Guidance") the government reports that, based on the 2000 Census, “over 26
million individuals speak Spanish and almost 7 million individuals speak an Asian or
Pacific Island language at home”. “LLP Guidance”, from where the LLP designation
emerged, was produced in conjunction with the Executive Order 13166, “Improving
Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency” and updated in 2003 to
include population information from the 2000 U.S. Census.
The Executive Order, signed in 2001 by then-President Bill Clinton, legally
recognizes language discrimination as part of “national origin discrimination” under Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Because language barriers can preclude access to
government programs and activities, “LLP Guidance” provides guidance or guidelines
for avoiding language-based discrimination through the adoption and implementation of
service provisions. The “LLP Guidance” is agency specific, and the language of the
guidelines is adapted slightly for each agency or organization required to follow its
guidelines, including Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the
Department of Justice. Both Title VI and Executive Order 13116 addendum apply to all
agencies and organizations receiving federal funding “by way of grant, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty” (“Transcript”), and this includes the
Department of Justice and local and federal courts.
Language becomes a barrier when, for one, service providers have difficulty serving
the needs of LLP populations (Peterson, 2001: 1). The designation of LLPs, then, is not
only a matter of communication; it is also an acknowledgement that language differences
can be an impediment to access, such as access before the law, for example. Specifically,
Title VI and Executive Order 13166 call for “meaningful” access:
The Executive Order requires Federal agencies to examine the services they
provide, identify any need for services to those with limited English proficiency
(LEP), and develop and implement a system to provide those services so LEP
persons can have meaningful access to them. It is expected that agency plans will
provide for such meaningful access consistent with, and without unduly
burdening, the fundamental mission of the agency. The Executive Order also
requires that the Federal agencies work to ensure that recipients of Federal
4

financial assistance provide meaningful access to their LEP applicants and
beneficiaries. (“Overview of Executive Order 13166”, my emphasis)
Beyond simply ‘access’, or being able to walk through the door, ‘meaningful’ access
suggests that those seeking federally-funded services will receive treatment at a level
necessary to interact effectively with service providers, the majority of whom, in a U.S.
context, are English-speaking. This interaction involves both the ability to relay needs
and concerns and to understand the options available, and it requires the implementation
of interpretation and translation services in these settings including, translated documents
and information pamphlets, the use of language lines,1 and the physically-present,
certified interpreters in the courtroom settings.
Are LLPs in and immigrants to Lexington, Kentucky, gaining meaningful access to
the law?2 And, what are the standards for interpretation that might ensure this? Before
delving into the former question, which will be explored throughout the course of this
thesis, I first look at both federal and Kentucky state interpretation certification policies
so as to better understand some of the actors implicated in the compliance of Title VI and
Executive Order 13166 and the possibility for access to law and legal language for the
Low Level Proficiency subject, who may also be a recent immigrant.

SPOKEN LANGUAGE COURT INTERPRETATION

“Removing barriers to communication helps ensure that
all citizens receive fair and equal access to justice.”
-The Kentucky Court of Justice (KCOJ)

Interpretation is needed during U.S. court proceedings when there are parties who do
not speak English proficiently or only speak a language other than English. The role of
the court interpreter is to “completely and accurately” (KCOJ) interpret (say) or translate
1

“Pacific Interpreters” is one example of a language interpretation provider. Over-the-phone
language interpretation services include “Language Line” (http://www.languageline.com).
2
This question is influenced by a 11 July 2008 article in the New York Times, “An Interpreter
Speaking Up for Migrants”. This article relays the concerns of an interpreter concerned with the
“rapid pace” and “pressure” involved in the hearings for migrant workers arrested at a
meatpacking raid in May of 2008. Concerns about interpretation have also been brought up
locally in the last decade. For example, the May 2001 edition of El Defensor/The Advocate is
dedicated to the topic.
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(write) what is stated or written during the proceedings of the Court. There are three
modes of interpreting including, ‘simultaneous’ interpreting, ‘consecutive’ interpreting,
and ‘sight’ interpreting/translating. Simultaneous interpreting, the most common form of
interpretation in the courtroom, happens concurrently with the transmission of the source
language and is intended for the party receiving the information in the target language.
Consecutive interpreting is meant to be heard by the entire court and happens after the
source-language speaker has stopped speaking or taken a pause in speech. Interpreting or
translating by sight entails reading a document in the source language and then writing or
speaking the contents in the target language. There is a code of interpretation practices,
and according to the Kentucky Court of Justice, an interpreter must:
1.) Remain neutral and unbiased.
2.) Never alter, omit, add or summarize while interpreting or translating.
3.) Never show or express emotions during a court proceeding.
4.) Never provide legal advice or become an advocate for either party in a
court proceeding.
In addition, under the “Code of Professional Responsibility for Interpreters”, interpreters
are expected to “maintain an impartial attitude” (3), to “conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the courts” (5); to “protect and uphold confidentiality” (6);
to conduct self-assessments and to continually improve their language skills (7-9).
Conflict of interest occurs when: 1) the interpreter is a friend, relative, or associate of the
party requiring interpretation services; 2) the interpreter has previously provided services
to the party; 3) the interpreter has assisted a law enforcement agency in the preparation of
the case at issue; 4) the interpreter or the interpreter’s spouse or child has a financial stake
in the outcome of the case; 5) the interpreter has been involved in the choice of counsel
or law firm for that case. An interpreter who is also an attorney is prohibited from
serving in both capacities in the same matter or case.
In accordance with the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 and the Amendments of 1988
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1827-1828), the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) establishes the
guidelines and standards for interpreter selection and use in federal court proceedings.
Federally, there are three classifications of interpreters: certified, professionally qualified,
and language skilled. For U.S. Courts, certification programs and examinations have
been developed for Spanish, Navajo, and Haitian-Creole (uscourts.gov). In languages
6

other than these three, interpreters are designated as either “professionally qualified” or
“language skilled”, as detailed in Table 2:
Table 2: “Federal Language Interpretation Classifications and Qualifications”
CLASSIFICATION
CERTIFIED

LANGUAGES
Spanish, Navajo,
or
Haitian-Creole

QUALIFICATIONS
Passing the Administrative Office
certification examination

PROFESSIONALLY
QUALIFIED

All other
languages

1) Previous employment with U.S. agency, United Nations,
or similar entity. Passing certification examination OR
2) Membership in professional interpreter association with: a)
50+ hours of conference interpreting and b) sponsorship from
(3) active members of same organization, who have been
members for 2 years, who interpret the same language as
applicant, and who will attest to applicant’s performance and
accuracy

LANGUAGE
SKILLED

All other
languages

Can demonstrate “to the satisfaction of the court” the ability
to effectively interpret from foreign language to English and
vice versa during court proceedings
Information source: U.S. Courts, www.uscourts.gov

In the federal courts, the “single greatest operational requirement” is for Spanishlanguage interpreters (uscourts.gov).

Other interpretation needs, as reported by the

federal judiciary, include, Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese, and Foochow), Portuguese,
Vietnamese, Korean, Russian, and Arabic. Spanish is also the major language requiring
interpretation in Lexington courts, and this is connected to the immigration influx
detailed above. In addition to Spanish, the other key languages requiring interpretation/
translation in Lexington, KY are Russian and other Slavic languages and French. This
need is due to the large number of immigrants in the area from the former-Yugoslavia as
well as immigrants and refugees from French-speaking Africa, including the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC).
The need for specific language interpreters is dictated by local language needs and is
determined by the local district courts. Court interpreters can be either federally or state
qualified (to work in federal or state courts), but state certification differs depending on
the state certification procedures and requirements. Within the past five years, there has
been a state-wide interpreter certification program established in Kentucky. Lexington
(Fayette County), however, is one of the few counties in the state with certified staff
7

interpreters in the Spanish language.

And, non-Spanish speakers here are often

dependent on contract interpreters, or, in some case, community interpreters, for which
the standards of proficiency are not equivalent to those in the state or federally certified
programs.
Kentucky has its own “Spoken Language Interpreters” Certification policy, effective
October, 2004 and amended November, 2006, and interpreters are also administrated by
the AOC.

As required by the Kentucky Court of Justice, spoken language court

interpreters must successful complete the state certification process, which, like the
federal exam entails both a written and oral examination. Kentucky has two levels of
spoken language court interpreters:
Table 3: “Kentucky Language Interpretation Classifications and Qualifications”
CLASSIFICATION

QUALIFICATIONS

QUALIFIED LEVEL 1
INTERPRETER

Pass a criminal history check; pass the Kentucky English Written Test; read
the Code of Professional Responsibility; take the Interpreter Oath; complete a
two-day orientation

CERTIFIED
INTERPRETER

Complete qualifications for “Qualified Level 1 Interpreter” AND successfully
pass the Kentucky Oral Test, or an AOC approved
Information Source: “Kentucky Certification Policy, Spoken Language Interpreters”

With the understanding that interpretation is central to the practice and formation of
law, this thesis focuses on language interpretation- the interpretation and transmission
from source language to target language- in a legal context in Lexington, Kentucky. By
‘legal context’, I mean of and pertaining to the law, and this includes interpretation both
inside and outside of the courthouse setting and extends to various facets of law. An
investigation into the mechanisms and applications of interpretation- to the practices,
logics, and politics of interpretation- is foundational to an examination of law and of the
roles of the actors/subjects delimited, enforced, and admitted by this institution and its
spaces. Interpretation occurs in different modalities, in a variety of legal scales, and
within many legal contexts. Because there are overlaps between language interpretation
8

and hermeneutical interpretation- the interpretation of codified, written law- within a
legal context, I treat ‘interpretation’ as a mediated practice, and I find analyses regarding
legal interpretation to be applicable to language interpretation in a legal space.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS & LAW’S TOUCHSTONES:
SOCIETY, SPACE, AND LANGUAGE

“The use and (re)production of law is a central way in which boundaries between groups of
people are (re)drawn in everyday life across a variety of different scales. Legal practices and
relations can be used in particular ways by people to define themselves (or others),
however temporarily, as insiders…or outsiders.”
-Albert White, 2002: 1060

According to Ed Soja (1985: 92), spatiality is “a social product and an integral part of
the material constitution and structuration of social life.” Space is understood to be
relational; that is, it is given meaning through human endeavors, and it is produced and
reproduced by and through socio-spatial relations (see Lefebvre, 2007). Space is not
objective; it is experienced and understood differently by different people. This might
lead us to ask: How is a space symbolically constructed at the level of the social
imaginary, and what are the concrete articulations of this? What are the mechanisms
behind the uneven (re)production of a space, and how is differentially manifested and
experienced? What social inequalities and political processes of inclusion and exclusion
are present, and what are the boundaries of a particular space?
The idea of and questions about space are central to the discussion of law, especially
considering the unevenness of rights or access within spatial relations or settings (see
Mitchell, 2005a; 2005b) and the spatiality of social life more generally (Soja, 1985).
Law is a social phenomenon (see Schwarzenberger, 1943: 94), and, like other social
processes, law’s application and structure transform and changes through time in
conjunction with changing social interests (Clark, 1990) and with place and scale and
historical specificity, or context. As a socio-spatial phenomenon, the space and spatial
politics of law exceed what is immediately present and visible so that the force of law
(Derrida 2000; Benjamin, 1996) is, in part, tied up in the symbolic power of legal
discourse as it relates to the creation and maintenance of difference before and within

9

legal space.

Law’s spaces are thus inseparable from the logics of law and its

practitioners.
Space and language cannot be easily disentangled, if untangled at all, and this is
nowhere more apparent then when the object of study is the law and legal space.
Because law -itself a discursive formation- forms a legal or juridical space as it intersects
with social, material, and discursive formations of legal subjects (those who have entered
into its jurisdiction), then we, following Albert White (2002) above, need to ask through
which mechanisms insiders and outsiders are constructed and bounded within or
excluded from this space.

This is especially important if we take seriously David

Sibley’s (1995) imperative that social geography, and I would add socio-legal geography,
must consider the question of exclusion because power is expressed through domination
of space.
Legal discourse is one type of social discourse, which is not only a political resource,
but a matter of the politics of interpretation (Delaney, 1993). Interpretation (the act, the
verb) is central to law in its make-up and law in action. Interpretation happens, takes
place, not just the explanations and interpretations of the law performed in supreme
courts (and legislated an enforced by the other two branches of the system of checks and
balances within the U.S. government, for example), but also in federal, state, and local
court proceedings, with court interpreters. Judges and law makers interpret the law for
meaning and enforcement; legal advocates and lobbyists interpret law for their
constituents; attorneys interpret the law (legalese) for their clients; and, in the U.S.
context, court interpreters and lawyers interpret the English language for Limited
Language Proficiency legal-subjects and for the entire courtroom.
The issues raised by Gordon Clark (2001) in his exegesis of RICHMOND V. CROSON,
make clear the difficulty- perhaps impossibility- of separating language from the legal,
and, in turn, he lays out guidelines for thinking through the complexity of the socio-legal
in terms of the politics of the force of legal interpretation at large. In his analysis of the
“contested quality” of the ruling, Clark offers three propositions about judicial opinions,
judicial reasoning, and judicial decision-making, propositions that provide insight into
legal logic as it relates to language and interpretation. Not only does legal/judicial
interpretation occurs on multiple scales within the U.S. legal system and in multifold
10

modalities, but there are overlaps in legal spaces between language interpretation –from
spoken source language to spoken target language- and hermeneutical interpretation- the
interpretation of codified, written law.
Clark’s first proposition, which draws on White’s work, is that judicial opinions are
crafted, argumentative texts, whose aim is justification and “strategic effectiveness”
(ibid.: 107).

Secondly, unlike literary texts or reasoning, legal reasoning results in

“immediate and authoritative interpretation”:
[J]udicial decision-making is neither as democratic nor as tolerant as literary
interpretive practice…The courts have a vital role to play in manufacturing
determinate conclusions out of competing claims made about the proper structure
of society. (ibid.)
Clark’s point is that legal interpretation serves a purpose: to lay down the law, so to
speak, without leaving room for interpretation despite conflicting interpretations. The
courts, as legal institutions (cf. Delaney, 2001; 2003), have a particular role to play in
society; and the interpretations of the courts, which are not outside of society in a
particular historic moment (see Holmes, 1944), contributes to the structuration of society.
Not simply ‘word’ (for a detailed examination into and theories of law as word, see
Cover, 1986; Sarat, 20013), law does its work in the world through linguistic strategies
and tactics, for example transfiguration, reductionism, and exclusion (Clark, 2001: 11112).
While the first two propositions describe “legal practice in relation to social conflict”
(ibid.: 108), the third proposition relates to the legitimizing grounds for judicial decisionmaking. Justification for judicial decisions, he claims, are based on idealizing one of the
following: a) the law as an institution; b) legal reasoning as a form of discourse; and/or c)
the normative image created by law. Clark posits that the United States, compared with
other countries with “similar political and cultural heritages”, is obsessed with law, and
this is reflected most obviously in the number of qualified lawyers per capita4 (ibid.). In
addition, he contends, “it is…apparent that many citizens have remarkably high
3

The linkage between word and deed is related to law’s violence.
As reported by the Avery Index, based on the 2000 census, Kentucky has 7.1 lawyers per every
10,000 residents, ranking 42nd in the country. Still, it is disconcerting that with the number of
attorneys, a lack of qualified attorneys is the major resource problem at the Maxwell Street Legal
Clinic, as discussed further below.
4
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expectations of the capacity of law to penetrate through to the practice of everyday life”
(ibid., my emphasis), as evidenced, perhaps, by the growing number of litigations in this
country.
Clark’s suggestions are important because they are skeptical toward the hegemony of
law “as the language of social life” (ibid.: 111) and consider that judicial interpretation,
and the contingent decision-making, involves, “judicial incapacity”, “analytical
abstraction”, and “incoherence of principles” (ibid.: 110).

Rather than a deus ex

machina, law is not without human error, moral and political theories, and prejudices.
Judges make mistakes; connections between theories and rules in an actual case are
elided; and there are inconsistencies throughout, including, perhaps, problems with
language interpretation and access to law.
Language interpretation and translation are always mediated, so that the result is an
“always possible but always imperfect compromise” (Derrida, 1992: 232).

This

compromise may be materially and spatially consequential to the extent that the conflicts
are explicitly about social space (Delaney, 1993: 48), and there are also spatial
(discursive and material) aspects of the process of interpretation.

Both legal

interpretation and interpretation in legal space go beyond the abstraction of theory and
have real affects on real people and real lives. With this in mind, and accepting that
language is “a system of power for those who control it” (Matoesian, 1993: 2), this thesis
pays particular attention to language interpretation in relation to law and meaningful
access to both law and legal spaces in Lexington, KY. My principal research questions
are as follows:
1.

What is legal space, and how is it produced the context of immigration and in
relation to immigrants in Lexington, KY?

* Is there a spatiality inherent to law? How does one enter this space? What are the
relationships between and among law, language, and legal space (the maintenance of
legal precedents, the cases being ‘heard’ within the walls of the courthouse)? How does
the material and discursive space of law structure the experiences and subject-formations
of those who encounter this space, whether voluntarily or involuntarily? What are the
local manifestations of these relationships?
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2. a) What limits exist to access to this space, how is access limited, and what role
does language interpretation play in opening/closing access?
* What are the relationships between language, legal space, and immigrant encounters?
How are strangers to the law maintained? That is, in what ways does the operation of law
make spaces that differentiate within itself and at multiple scales or sites? Who are the
actors that serve to establish these differentiations?

How might language barriers,

specifically, limit access to the law, and what could be the outcomes of this? What role
do language interpretation services and access to these services play in access to law and
law’s spaces?
b) What are the effects of limits to access on immigrants and their access to
the law in Lexington, KY?
* How do the practices and discourse of and related to law inform or limit some notion of
publicity? What are the effects of inclusion and exclusion produced by language, law,
and space, possibly with regard to immigrants in the Lexington area? What role do local
legal strategies play in contesting these barriers or closures? Are LLPs and immigrants in
Lexington, Kentucky, gaining meaningful access to law?

THESIS ROADMAP

Guided by these questions, this thesis examines the role of language interpretation in
the production of legal space in Lexington, Kentucky through an analysis of legal
interpretation practices and outlooks in order to ascertain how these practices may affect
non-native or low-proficiency English speakers’ experiences with both federal and local
laws. What follows addresses how language interpretation, as mediation, figures into
legal subject-formation, arguing that language use is linked to social exclusion in spaces
and places of encounter. To situate my thesis, I introduce the relationships between
language, law, and space at the intersection of legal geographies literatures, theories of
public space, and feminist jurisprudence. Studies in critical legal geographies, I show,
are indebted to the history of work in jurisprudence and to the work by scholars in
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geography grappling with questions of space and spatiality. The major theoretic lenses of
‘geography in law’ and ‘law in geography’ point to the inextricability of the legal and the
social. Insights into law as both a set of discourses and a set of institutions provide
building blocks for an analysis of the role of interpretation in juridical space in a
particular, local, geographic context such as Lexington, KY.
Like law, public space is the product of competing ideas and ideals about what it is.
Attention to public space, I argue, is fundamental to unfolding the problematic of
openness and closure in legal spaces, as this literature in particular makes significant
contributions to questions of inclusion in, access to, and regulation of space. Feminist
jurisprudence, or feminist legal philosophy, can also provide some of the tools needed for
approaching law, for documenting and researching law in action, and for struggling with
and against law and, thus, for combating law’s closure.

Of especial import are

feminism’s attention to relationality and intersectionality in terms of socio-spatial
production and law.
In Chapter IV, I introduce and explain the methods and methodological approach
used to answer my principal research question. As a place-based study, this research
involves in-depth qualitative research. Specifically, my methods of data collection for
this research project include: 1) participant observation at local legal clinic; 2) participant
observation at a Lexington Circuit Courthouse; and 3) semi-structured interviews of
seven key informants. The interviewees for this research project are all legal employees
of some variety who deal with issues involving law and interpretation in the Lexington
area, and each of these interviews was concerned with the question of language and
access to law. I analyze the transcripts of my semi-structured interviews and field notes
from observations using coding methods, and I treat these documents as primary texts.
Next, I take a look at some of the barriers, gaps, distance, and instances of mediation
involved in language interpretation and think about how this affects access to law’s
space. I consider interpretation quality and availability, and I explore interpretation as a
mediated practice.

In Chapter V, I further expand upon language proficiency and

language interpretation in legal spaces. Here, I recognize that perceptions influence
practices, and I begin to explore local legal strategies and tactics in the face of language
barriers and barriers to meaningful legal access. By way of a conclusion, I summarize
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my research findings and make some suggestions about the effects of access or lack of
access on social membership and belonging. Using the methodological framework of
feminist geo-jurisprudence throughout, this research contributes to our understanding of
the limits of the publicity of legal space and, more specifically, of the ways in which
language barriers can prevent legal inclusion. This thesis also touches on some of the
local responses for dealing with the challenges to “meaningful access before the law”
(“Title VI”) in Lexington, Kentucky, and it points toward the broader implications of
language access for immigrants at the intersection of legal discourse and society.
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE:
FORCING THEORETICAL OPENINGS
WITH FEMINIST GEO-JURISPRUDENCE
“Law sits poised between the present reality of violence
and the promises of a justice not yet realized”
-Austin Sarat, 2001: 8

Socially produced space and discourse are saturated with power relationships, and
law is no exception to this. The conjunction of law and geography offers insight into
these power relationships in their specificity and questions the boundaries and limits of
legal space and legal discourse. Studies in critical legal geographies, which deal with
how law and space bear upon each other, provide building blocks for an analysis of the
role of interpretation in legal space in a particular U.S. geographic context such as
Lexington, Kentucky. These insights, I argue, are further augmented by attention to the
how both legally-defined access to space and access to law as a space and discourse have
potential implications for public space and publicity. The consideration of the public
space literatures in geography together with the perspectives of feminist jurisprudence and its methods of positionality and intersectionality- further opposes law’s positivism
and press against law’s closures toward an agenda for social change.

GEOGRAPHY IN LAW/ LAW IN GEOGRAPHY:
C R I T I C A L L E G A L G E O G R A P H I ES , A N O V ER V I E W

“Law is a presence, resource, or material force in the world that not only
makes things happen, it makes them happen in particular ways.”
-Nicholas Blomley, 2003: 23

Critical legal geographies are indebted to the intellectual pathways carved by theorists
in geography wrestling with questions of space and spatiality and to the history of work
in jurisprudence, especially Critical Legal Studies (CLS). CLS seek to demonstrate the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine; to consider a historical and socio-economic analysis in
order to identify how certain interest groups benefit from legal decisions despite the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine; to expose how legal interpretation characterizes outsiders
and legitimates juridical effects; and to make new and marginalized social visions part of
legal discourse (Kedar, 2003; Minda, 1995; Minow, 1986). CLS question assumptions
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about the neutralizing, naturalizing, and universalizing tendencies of law to show how an
abstract and professional legal discourse often justifies domination and privilege while
simultaneously claiming neutrality in process and outcome (Kedar, 2003; Minda, 1995).
Legal geography research picks up on these themes, while realizing that the legal and
the spatial cannot be easily de-linked and are actually, in significant ways, “aspects of
each other” (Blomley, et al. 2001).

Like Critical Legal Studies, a critical legal

geography, as detailed by David Delaney (1993: 62), is marked by a “pronounced
skepticism toward the artificial distinction between law and society” (see also Blomley,
et al., 2001) because social relations are constituted both legally and spatially (ibid.: 63).
The ‘opening’ of law within the messiness and contingency of social and political
relations is central to the critical position counter to the assumptions within Western law
and legal practice of legal ‘closure’, the characterization of law as an autonomous area
and a self-sufficient field (Blomley, 1994: 7; White, 2002:1057).
Geographers began publishing widely on the topic of critical legal geography in the
early 1990s. For example, Nicholas Blomley in Law, Space, and the Geographies of
Power (1994), points to the interconnectedness of law and space and to the critical
exposition of oppressive power structures that occurs with their theoretical union. With
this publication, Blomley urgently expresses the need for more research at the
intersection of law and geography. However, as Alexandre Kadar (2003) notes, the terms
‘legal geography’ and ‘geojurisprudence’ had appeared already in the 1920s in the works
of German scholars, including those of Merk and Langhans-Razeburg. The emergence of
critical legal geography could also be traced to a number of articles appearing in the
1980s and to the “Legal Geographies Series” in Urban Geography in 1993 (Forest,
2000).

Still, even with its relative newness in Anglo-academia, geographers have

covered a number of topic areas under the auspices of ‘legal geography’, by its spirit
‘critical’, in that this theoretical lens seeks to challenge norms and assumptions with
concern to the geographical dimensions of law.
Some of the research topics in geography that link law with both social
relations/practices and space include: investigations of legal abandonment (Pratt, 2005);
considerations of law and violence (Blomley, 2003; Secor, 2007); examinations of law,
geography, and property (Blomley, 2003; 2004a; 2004 b; 2004c; 2005; Mitchell, 2005b);
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questions of the legal geographies of responsibility (Atkins, et al., 2006); and the role of
law and the construction of race (Delaney, 1993) and nature (Delaney, 2001). Of course,
due to the interconnectedness of law and geography, scholars in various sub-fields within
the discipline have dealt with questions of the legal without assuming the title of ‘legal
geographies’. Migration literatures within geography, for one, have also brought to the
table questions of legal spaces, legality, and the contradictory and boundary-forming
qualities of law (see for example Coleman, 2008).

Within the domain of ‘legal

geography’, there are several different theoretical and analytical outlooks. While these
ideal types simplify a scrutiny of legal geography’s contributions, the complexity of this
work does not conform to an easy binary. In order to provide an overview of the
literature and to explore the basic concepts therein, I will nonetheless parse apart the
major distinctions between ‘geography in law’ and ‘law in geography’.
The first heuristic strand, ‘geography in law’, or ‘space in law’, focuses on the
spatiality of law and legal texts. Attention to ‘geography in law’ reveals geographic
influences on the positivism of law- how law is, including “informal social institutions
and the practices such as community, custom, and citizenship” (Holder and Harrison,
2003: 3-4). This, in effect, can destabilize the normativity and objectivity of law (Jones,
2003: 186) and the abstract application of legal doctrine and principles. A spatio-legal
analysis suggests that law “must make room for local conditions and experience, and
recognize the changing of laws to work in local contexts” (Holder and Harrison, 2003: 34).

Geographers working ‘in law’ stress the centrality of geographical context- its

specificity, particularity- to legal discourse and legal space, and, in doing so, seek to
upset the monolithic conception and rhetoric of the law.
Legal geography, thus, brings attention to the local legal universes, or “legal
localization” (Cotterrell, 2006: 42), forms of regulation and litigation that are less abstract
because rooted in particular and the specific historical periods and spaces and places.
Legal norms and enforcement policies/practices in Lexington, KY, for example, may
differ from those in other U.S. cities or at other scales.

Because geographical

imaginations and experiences play a role in the operation of law and the inscribing of
spatial categorization and differentiation, reading law through geography, then,
penetrates more deeply into legal decision-making and the stakes that come with it.
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Contradictory legal practices, as White (2002) finds, also create uneven geographies of
law, which result in different experiences and daily realities for actors in this particular
system of power. Locally specific legal needs are also important, especially if place
affects law and legal process/practices/relations.
Law, though not an autonomous field, is itself a kind of space, and it has its own
geography.

Difference and specificity between and amongst gender, race, class,

citizenship status, and sexual orientation affect legal interpretation and enforcement, and
the “legal terrain is criss-crossed” with uneven relations that marginalize and exclude
some individuals and groups (White, 2002: 1057).

This, in turn, creates different

positionalities in the social milieu and its constituent spaces, including legal space.
Pointing to the processes of creating of legal boundaries elucidates the mutuality of law
and geography, or the law-space dialectic (see for example Collins, 2007). While legal
texts draw upon spatial categorization, law simultaneously shapes the spatiality of the
material world; spatial context shapes law and legal relations while law shapes spaces
and places.
Inquiries through the perspective of ‘law in geography’ show us that law takes many
forms in society and daily life, including a tangible material presence. Not only do
spaces, local and otherwise, influence legal interpretations and their effects (spatial
context), but law beyond legal doctrines also takes form physically and can have special
effects. Law, in legitimating spatiality, can shape material reality and structuration. As
Delaney (2001) reminds us, law is not just simply a set of discourses but also a set of
institutions. ‘Doing law’ in geography, then, “has the capacity to release law from its
(imposed and self-imposed) confinement as ‘word’ (interpretation, meaning discourse)
and to show ‘the legal work in the world’, a world dominated by the physical (places,
landscapes, spatialities, natures)” (Delaney, 2003: 78). Because many spatial orderings
are legal orderings, and the converse is also true (Blomley, 2002), legal and socio-spatial
phenomena are inseparable. A legal-geographic analysis emphasizes how law works in
the creation of spatial order; there is no clear line of separation between legal and spatial
norms and concerns. For example, law in the form of codes and zoning laws plays a role
in the (re)production of the city. Social control arguably occurs through the legal control
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of space, and the material effects of law are most apparently displayed in analyses of the
legal regulation and policing practices in public space.
The rules of behavior in and use of public spaces, most of which begin as social
norms, are increasingly articulated in legal terms (Ellickson, 2001). For these reasons,
the public space literature in geography, explored in more detail below, converges with
and overlaps with legal geographies (see Blomley, 1994; 2004a). Don Mitchell, for one,
looks at the interaction of law and public space by focusing in on the ways that law
defines this space in order to suggest “the annihilation of space by law” (1997). In his
article of the same name, Mitchell contends that by redefining and policing what counts
as acceptable behavior in public spaces, the legal regime in the American city has limited
the actions of a specific population, the homeless, and has attempted in the process to
erase those people who occupy public space (see also Mitchell, 1995). These legal
interventions are achieved through direct force, but also through the surveillance and the
policing of the ‘streets’- the material places of the city- and through legal definitions and
innovations.
What kinds of tensions occur in legal spaces, and how are the boundaries of this space
regulated so as to restrict access for certain individuals and groups?

In the social

sciences, including geography and legal geography, relatively few scholarly articles have
dealt with law within the courthouse or courtroom (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). Mitchell
(2005b) calls for a more in-depth understanding of legal geographies to include, for one,
full legal histories of cases in legal spaces rather than simply examinations of final court
decisions. Spatial context matters; however, it is often neglected in the deciding of court
cases, and likewise court proceedings and the courthouse as a site of inquiry are often
ignored in geographic literatures. Matthew Sparke’s 1998 piece “A Map that Roared…”
is one of only a handful of studies that examines the content and textuality of law before
and during court proceedings- within material legal space. Nicholas Fyfe (2005), too,
seeks to analyze geography, the geography of witness vulnerability, by concentrating on
the space of the courtroom during the trial period. Witness vulnerability, he contends, is
linked to encounters with and within the publicly accessible spaces surrounding and
inside the court building.

The idea of the courthouse and courtroom as spaces of

intimidation is an interesting one that builds upon the work of Ruth Panelli, Jo Little, and
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Anna Kraack (2004), who suggest that certain spaces and places are “emotionally
charged terrain”.
With the empirical study of the Toronto Women’s bathhouse raid and its aftermath,
Alison Bain and Catherine Nash (2007) also contribute to this short-list of literature with
their findings that identity can be incoherent with the discourses of the courtroom. Bain
and Nash, contending that the state makes pervasive and often intangible interventions
into our everyday lives, look at how the state negotiates the boundaries of illegality and
immorality through normalizing tendencies and disciplining assimilation with regard to
identity recognition. They find that “a closer reading of the decision demonstrates how
the state, through its legal discourses and practices, can reinforce hegemonic notions of
sexual and gendered subjects while rendering a decision that ostensibly supports the
‘rights’ of gay and lesbian citizens” (2007: 27).

Concerned (both analytically and

methodologically) with notions of sexual citizenship and the abstract violence (in its
erasure) of both legal and media discourse and practice, their study suggests that notions
of sexual citizenship are “actually carefully disciplined within hegemonic discourse”
(2007: 31). Sparke’s work, Fyfe’s, and that of Bain and Nash all point towards the
question: To what extent do laws, space, and language reinforce a subordinate social
status? And, how does material and discursive accessibility contribute to this?

LEGAL/PUBLIC SPACES:
T O W A R D S C O N C E P T U A L I ZI N G T H E L I M I T S

&

EF F E C TS O F A C C E S S I N G L A W

“If space is a dominant currency in geography, then the boundaries of space
are all-important, particularly when created, or reinforced, by the concepts of law”
-Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison, 2003: 6

Attention to public space is key to unfolding the problematic of openness and closure
in legal spaces, as this literature in particular makes significant contributions to questions
of inclusion in, access to, and regulation of space. As detailed above, law, contrary to
rhetoric about it being ‘rational’ and well ordered, is neither consistent nor monolithic
(cf. Blomley, 1994). Public space is as complex and contested a matter as law, and there
is also room for interpretation of its form, use, and definition. The boundaries of public
space, as well as questions regarding who makes up this public and the extent or limits of
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their participation is the subject of much of the public space literature in geography. The
coupling of the public space and the legal geographies literatures, especially in terms of
property rights, makes clear that rights to access are not absolute (they are geographically
contingent and specific) and both rights and restrictions are a matter of legal and spatial
categorization as well as legal and public debates. Both public spaces and legal spaces
serve as a testing ground for deliberations with regard public responsibility and solidarity,
individual rights, national identity, and immigration policy. Public space is most relevant
to the topic of interpretation in the moments of theorization where it converges with
considerations of the public sphere and of publicity more generally and where questions
about public space overlap with legal geographies literatures.
Like law, public space is the product of competing ideas and ideals about what it is.
In its broadest sense, public space is “a space to which all citizens are granted some
[never absolute] legal rights to access” (Light and Smith, 1998: 3). Public space has been
theorized as a space of entertainment and consumption, and also a site of civic duty,
political debate, and social education. As conveyed by Mitchell (1995; 2003), there are
two contradictory understandings of public space.

The first, “implies a notion of

inclusiveness that becomes a rallying point for successive waves of political activity”
(1995: 117). The ideal, utopian public spaces are “civic spaces” (Light and Smith, 1998);
this kind of public space is marked by its openness- its “free interactions and the absence
of coercion by powerful institutions” (Mitchell, 1995: 115). The ideal vision of public
space, as Susan Ruddick (1996: 133) points to, is founded on two major assumptions
about the nature of public space: 1) “that public spaces are universally accessible to a
civic public” and 2) that public spaces are equated with the local level, circumscribed by
processes at regional, national, and international scales rather than the inverse.
The second understanding of public space is as a restrictive space “in which citizens
gather to form themselves into, and represent themselves as, a public” (Light and Smith,
1998: 3). This vision of public space is “subject to an appropriate public that is allowed
in” to this “controlled and orderly” space (Mitchell, 1995: 115).

It is the tension

(sometimes violent) between these two understandings- the ideal and the normative- that
shape and re-shape public space. Moreover, because of the double bind of the private
and the public, those responsible for enforcing and upholding the legal order, including
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legal practitioners and enforcers of law, must protect and maintain the boundaries
through control of these spaces. Thus, “[m]uch contemporary conflict over public space
is in fact conflict over these grades of access” (Light and Smith, 1998: 3, my emphasis).
Public space is constantly being reworked through defining who has access to these
spaces, for how long, and in what capacity.
The question of public space, it follows, is both about the formation of the space itself
and the composition of publicity. The “status as ‘public’ is created and maintained”
through an ongoing opposition of the visions or understandings of public space
(Mitchell, 1995: 115), and thoughts about the make-up of the public, in turn, merge with
the spaces with which they have been implicated (Light and Smith 1998: 1). In this
regard, public space is “a foundation or place for the struggle for inclusion, for promoting
particular visions of how the public should be constituted and promoting rights that
members of the public carry” (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008: xiv). Making claims to and in
public, then, is part of making claims on the public as part of the public.
Public space is marked by its visibility, and public protest in public space is a way for
the populous to show themselves, asserting themselves as part of the public, as part of the
‘People’ (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). Public spaces, in their visibility, have become
what Blomley (2004: 49) calls “flashpoints in the neoliberal city”, where the “politics of
public space” play out (Low and Smith, 2006). Not only are public spaces a potential site
of struggle, but -perhaps because of this- they are also sites for monitoring control, from
the side of enforcement and law-making agencies (Smith, 1997; Mitchell, 1995).
Policing, privatization, regulation, and the fight for public space can involve and
implicate law (Mitchell, 1995, 1997, 2005a; 2005b; Blomley, 2004).
Geographers, most notably Mitchell (2005a: 85), have explored the interaction of law
and public space in, particularly the ways that law serves to restrict public space and the
people in them by redefining what is ‘public’. Mitchell (2005a) documents some of the
ways that law serves to erase public space by constructing “a whole new kind of privacy
in public space, a kind of privacy that might have profound effects on the possibilities for
political discourse and the public forum” (Mitchell, 2005a: 80). In reading HILL V.
COLORADO and examining the Court’s logic in its decision, he looks at how law, by an
issuing of rights, particularly the “right to be left alone”, can amount to the shrinking or
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erasing of public space by the expansion of privacy in public space. He argues that this
sets a new standard so that there can be no expectation of publicity in public space
(2005a: 81), and he suggests that the expansiveness of this legal innovation establishes a
“new legal foundation for a new kind of citizenship (a citizenship based on, and
protective of, the fully privatized juridical individual)” (ibid.).
The legality of public space and legal definitions of the public serve to constitute
public space, and access to public space- both by and to the ‘public’- is central to an
understanding of public space and the possibility of democratic politics in these spaces.
The rules of access to public space determine, not only the make-up of public space and
the public, but also the possibilities for association that may take place in them:
[T]he nature of public space in part defines the nature of citizenship. It shapes
modes of engagement, the visibility of alternative politics, and the possibility for
unscripted (that is involuntary) interactions. It provides a ‘space of engagement’
within which the public (or various publics) come to recognize themselves.
(Mitchell, 2005a: 85)
Public spaces occupy both an ideological and a material position in democratic societies
(Mitchell, 1995; 1997; 2003; 2005a; 2005b) historically (classical Athens, for example)
as well as in the present. The strangers who encounter and engage with each other in
these spaces are the ‘public’ because of, and not despite of, their difference. These
spaces, then, are important to questions of both democracy and citizenship in the United
States (Mitchell, 1995; 2005a). This leads us to ask: what are the democratic iterations of
a diminishing ‘public’ where strangers can meet?
Those who lament the loss of public space see its decline as directly linked to a loss
of public participation in the non-visible or less readily visible spaces of the ‘public’. To
many scholars, especially those drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas, public space is
critical to participatory democracy because it is linked to the rise of the public sphere (see
for example Ruddick, 1996; Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008), which involves the domain of
social life as it pertains to the creation of public opinion. Public spaces potentially
provide a meeting place and space for encounters between individuals and groups who
might not otherwise meet, and this is necessary for the expansion of a public sphere
where societal problems can be discussed and political action influenced (Ruddick, 1996:
133).

While the public sphere occupies the discursive and somewhat elusive political
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realm, Mitchell (1995: 116) contends that “public space represents the material location
where the social interactions and political activities of all members of the ‘public’ occur.”
In this way, public space provides a concrete basis for the public sphere. The borders of
the public sphere are contested (Blomley, 2001), and like public space, there are multiple
understandings of this kind of space, so that it is debated whether the public sphere is an
open site, a democratic site, or an exclusive domain. The redefinitions of publicity by
law have recreated the public sphere, the abstract public space, based on exclusivity- a
move that Mitchell (2005a) argues is “justified” through both moral and aesthetic
discourses and practices. Ideally, however, as with a town commons or a public square, a
healthy public sphere (and its spaces) foster a form of public input/debate and, hence, a
form of democracy.
Legal space is not just material (the space of the courthouse, the law offices where
cases are discussed), but also immaterial, so that legal space could be likened to a
discursive public square, a space of legal encounters where cases are deliberated and
precedents maintained or transformed.

Blomley (2001) argues that public space is

material space, but public space, especially where it overlaps with understandings of the
public sphere and law, is both “idea and practice” (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). Can
public space, or at least (public) legal space, be thought in terms of symbolic or
discursive space? While it is important not to conflate ‘public space’ with the ‘public
sphere’, as Blomley (2001) also reminds us, it is possible to think of language and access
to language as the site of certain legal struggles and the question of legal access- to the
publicity of legal space. Access to this discursive legal space is, in part, reliant upon, not
visibility, but aurality, especially in terms of interpretation practices.5 To what extent can
language be thought of as a ‘concrete’ site of debate, regulation, political movement in
law? That is, must we consider the public square or the ‘streets’ in order to question
access to the public domain and, possibly, legal transgression (see Cresswell, 1996)?
Like public space, which provides a window into the public sphere, language,
including legal language and language use in a legal context, is also site of encounter or
contact zone, especially when it is mediated through interpretation. Because language in
its establishment of meaning is “the key to understanding most human interactions”
5

This is especially clear in the case of the need for sign-language interpretation in the courts.
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(Lofland, et al, 2006: 87) and is “a system of power for those who control it” (Matoesian,
1993: 2), language interpretation practices in a legal setting and throughout the legal
apparatus have major implications for inclusion in the national community (see for
example Wani, 1989-90) and for the possibility of meaningful access before and within
law. For these reasons, considerations of language interpretation and language use in
legal settings may provide further insight into ideas about the public, and, similar to
theories of public space, could bring more tangibility to the intangible public sphere.
How does language differentiate groups or individuals before the law? What role do
interpretation services and interpretation practices play in gaining access to or being
excluded from the material and discursive spaces of the law? To what effect?

CONTINUING TO CHALLENGE LEGAL AND SPATIAL CLOSURE:
F E M I N I S T G E O - J U R IS P R U D E N C E

“I emphasize the question of relational positioning for it enables us to begin to deconstruct
the regimes of power which operate to differentiate one group from another; to represent
them as similar or different; to include or exclude them from constructions of the ‘nation’
and the body politic; and which inscribe them as juridical, political, and psychic subjects.”
-Avtar Brah, 1996: 183

Feminist jurisprudence, or feminist legal philosophy, can provide geographers with
some of the tools needed for approaching law, for documenting and researching law in
action, and for struggling with and against law and, thus, for combating law’s closure.
Not simply a juridical philosophy of women, feminist jurisprudence seeks to explore how
law is implicated in the perpetuation of unequal social relations.

Research at the

intersection of law and space is most appropriately conducted through the lens of feminist
jurisprudence because this analytical and methodological approach allows for
considerations of relationality and intersectionality (Johnson, 2005) in terms of sociospatial production and law. Feminist theory working with concern to law points out some
of the theoretical contentions of both geography and feminism, forcing questions of how
difference and specificity serve to create positionalities in the society and its spaces. Just
as Blomley (1994) and others call for an entrance of a critical geographical consciousness
into legal theory to press on the contours of juridical space and push against positivist
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tendencies of closure in order to force openings, so, too, do feminist theories stress the
importance of feminism in both theory and practice.
A commitment to feminism is a commitment to a “critical political consciousness”
(hooks, 1993: 51), a belief that it is the ordering principles and knowledge producing
technologies that operate throughout society to maintain what hooks calls the “white
supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class structure” (ibid.). Because categorizations of sex
and gender are inherently flawed and dualistic, this consciousness escapes the
essentialization and resists easy logics and binaries in general. Feminism, or, more
acutely, a feminist consciousness, critically engages with and attempts to destabilize the
institutions and modes of thought that perpetuate these uneven social relations. In a
move similar to hooks’, Audrey Kobayashi (1994), calls for “coloring the field”, that is,
for an understanding of the intersectionality of gender, race, and research, and the
implications for making social change. This requires forms of critical scholarship that
“neutralize academic and other social traditions that perpetuate subordinating relations
between gender and ‘race’” and “unnaturalize the scripts through which we conduct our
research” (ibid., 78). In geography, and in the social sciences more broadly, feminist
inquiries into methods and methodology have been the locus of critical questioning as far
as how to decolonize methodology in order to decolonize research (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999:
9; cf. Jones, et al., 1997) so as to challenge society’s structures.
In order to question positivist science and the gendering of that science (see for
example Cope, 2002), feminist scholars have called for both the reconsideration of
methodologies and the inclusion of other forms of knowing as valid knowledge.
“Methodologies”, Kim England (2006: 286), explains, are “the epistemological or
theoretical stance taken towards a particular research problem”. Methodology has very
much to do with sight (Rose, 2001), but it is not so much about what we see as it is about
how we see, of how we think we see what we see (Haraway, 1991); this is related to our
viewpoint, or positionality. Feminist methodology also involves “relational modes of
knowing”, such as nonhierarchical relationships, reciprocal learning, and expressions of
empathy (Jones, et al., 1997: xv).

Some feminist social scientists have explored

alternative, anti-positivist ways of knowing with the collecting of and telling of oral
stories (see for example Nagar, 1997; Behar, 2003); by questioning the qualitative/
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quantitative binary (Lawson, 1995); through mental mapping; with different types of
ethnographic research, including participant observation; and in turning in on themselves
(see for example J. Mitchell, 1982). If knowledge production is connected to power, as
not only Foucault (1980), but also many feminist theorists contend (see for example
Bordo, 1993), then questions of methodology are crucial to the feminist project and any
intellectual project concerned with social inequality, especially because practices are
legitimated by what is accepted as knowledge. When combined with a geographical
understanding of law and space, feminism provides insights for looking at legal
knowledge production in order to upset the power and rhetoric of law.
Feminist jurisprudence, understood as a combination of methodologies- feminist
methodologies plus legal methodologies (see for example Bartlett, 1990), offers that
ideological production is linked to legal protections (Alexander, 2005: 37) and, it follows,
to socio-spatial practices and production. Practitioners of feminist jurisprudence have
sought to challenge the fundamentalism and normativity of law by looking at the
structures that produce and reproduce inequality. Feminist legal theorists might ask:
What are the systems of assumptions, practices, and mechanisms that collectively serve
to differentiate legal-subjects to the benefit of some but not others? Adding geographical
insights into feminist jurisprudence’s key questions will allow us to probe: How is legal
space implicated in this? Feminist jurisprudence must be considered in order to have
truly ‘critical’ critical legal geographies-to expose the socio-spatial and legal processes
that (re)produce inequalities between people before law and in legal spaces.
Some of the theoretical considerations made manifest by feminist jurisprudence and
applicable to the study of legal space are as follows: feminism confronts masculine bias
within the law and questions the role of power in legal practice (see for example Johnson,
2005); feminism reminds us that law is inscribed upon bodies and at multiple scales;
feminism makes suspect legal categorization and the definition of life itself under law;
feminist accounts and theories of law draw attention to the violence inherent in the law
and insist that law’s violence be acknowledged (Robson, 1998). Feminist legal scholars
expound that the personal is political and therefore complicate and problematize easy
public/private distinctions and divides (see for example Jamieson, 2003). Feminists, like
geographers, also conceptualize law as changing and indeterminate rather than fixed,
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static, or monolithic. While both feminism and jurisprudence are complex and contested
terrains of thought and meaning-making, feminism brings much to jurisprudence, and the
collaboration of feminism with jurisprudence gives theoretical insights into feminism, as
well as to epistemology. Feminism in action (working) with concern to law points out
the theoretical contentions of feminism and pushes on feminism to have theories that
better address the concerns of the material world.
Feminism, at its onset both a theoretical and political movement, is an attempt to
address the difference and sameness of the “second sex” (De Beauvoir, 1949), realizing
that ‘woman’ is a social construction but that women figure differently in cultural, social,
economic, and political norms than men. As feminist thought has shown us, however,
‘woman’ is not a stable category within itself; it is not just a simple matter of women
versus men. Instead, there are differences between and amongst women, and class, race,
and sexual orientation serve to position different women in different ways in the cultural,
social, economic, and political milieu.

Feminism has brought us to a relational

understanding of difference so that feminists can be both same and different and work
together toward specific ends, in solidarity against hegemony (hooks, 1993).
These strands of feminist thought and debate are manifest in feminist legal theory as
well. Indeed, as an institution and a discourse, the law “has the potential to substantially
influence social relations and…the intersectionality of class, race and gender systems
produce uneven social relations that subordinate disadvantaged groups” (Kainer, 2005:
118). The movement from questions of equality under the law (women should have the
same rights as men), then, has given way to questions of sameness, difference, and
absences (MacDonald, 2005). Critical questioning of the law and of the logics and
sensibilities that operationalize law and play out in daily lives are an area of focus. Other
questions have also emerged: Does society determine law, or does law determine society?
That is, is a law most effective when the social conditions for it have already been met?
And, how do we deal with the apparent contradictions of law, its seemingly simultaneous
purpose of protection and enforcement?
The debate at hand is well demonstrated in the work of Joan Williams (1989),
Catherine MacKinnon, particularly “Reflections of Sex Equality Under the Law” (1991)
and the response launched at MacKinnon by Angela Harris in “Race and Essentialism in
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Legal Theory” (1990). As Williams and Harris both make clear, thinking law only in
terms of the difference between men and women and dominance of women by men is a
slippery slope, which has the effect of essentializing Woman, while eliding the concerns
of gender, race, and class differences. Nonetheless, even marked anti-racist scholars, like
MacKinnon, can fall into this trap when trying to come up with universal aims for
feminism and law based on notions of sex difference only. Harris (1990: 585) explains:
Just as law itself, in trying to speak for all persons, ends up silencing those
without power, feminist legal theory is in danger of silencing those who have
been traditionally been kept from speaking, or who have been ignored when they
spoke, including black women. The first step toward avoiding this danger is to
give up the dream of gender essentialism.
In response, Harris calls for a “jurisprudence of multiple consciousness” (ibid.: 590) and
notes that to be “fully subversive, the methodology of feminist legal theory should
challenge not only law’s content but its tendency to privilege the abstract and unitary
voice” (ibid.: 585). Furthermore, with the recognition that “even a jurisprudence based
on multiple consciousness must categorize” (ibid.: 585), Harris suggests moments of
strategic essentialism as a means toward political goals, which challenge the enforcement
of law and law’s (flawed) definitions of life itself. With the acknowledgement of this
messiness, feminist jurisprudence, like a critical legal geography, can disrupt a
monolithic understanding of law without ignoring the power of law.
Multiple consciousness works to force apart easy binaries (man/woman, legal/illegal,
etc.) and to bring to the forefront the multiple, sometimes contradictory, ways that power
operates in our lives depending on our subject positioning (see Brah, 1996).

In

jurisprudence, positional understanding “requires efforts both to establish good law and
to keep it in place” and is, ultimately, about deconstructing and improving law (Bartlett,
1990: 887). Feminist jurisprudence takes into consideration that “[l]inear logic implies a
normativeness of experience, which law always attempts to approximate” (MacDonald,
2005: 62). Instead of asking how women and men are treated differently before the law,
a feminist response to jurisprudence critiques the entire apparatus of the law, recognizing
that “…the overarching message is that the law is neither neutral nor objective and static”
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(Kainer, 2005: 134).

Theories of intersectionality and positionality, like critical

geographies of law and space, recognize law as a socio-legal phenomenon, subject to
political and social struggles.
Both epistemologically and as a mode of analysis/practice, feminist jurisprudence
works against logics of hierarchy that unevenly differentiate those on the margins of the
dominant ideal or norm. Feminism brings critical questions to law, including: Can the
law still be a “transformative and emancipatory instrument, flawed and recalcitrant
though it may be?” (Menon, 2004: 9). Ruthann Robson (1998) contention that the law
itself is violent is both a critical moment in feminist jurisprudence and in jurisprudence in
general. But can law be wielded to challenge law? If law governs the sphere of social
relations, then where else can we turn to combat the pervertability of these relations?
With the heuristic tool of ‘fire’, Robson provides us with a useful starting point for
looking for openings to challenge the force of law and the juridical effect; hers is a kind
of “incendiary logics”. Law, she states, is coercion rather than persuasion. However,
like fire, law is both destructive and productive.

With a stance of non-negotiable

politics,6 or ‘arson’, perhaps law can fight law, and the violence of law (in its concrete,
life-defining capabilities) can be used to establish non-hierarchical relationships where
the constellation of race, class, sexual orientation, and sex are not ignored. Although
‘justice’ can never be fully materialized due to the nature of ‘law’, as Robson might
contend, the struggle for justice is the struggle of feminist jurisprudence.
Like legal geographies, feminist jurisprudences reveal that paradox of law: law both
enforces and protects. It is implicated as an “instrument of socio-spatial control” (Collins
and Kearns, 2001), yet, contradictorily, it can also be used as a mechanism to challenge
law (see for example Boyer, 2006). With this in mind, I suggest that the intersection of
geography, law, and feminism could reveal further openings in the spaces of the law and
be the most effective theoretical combination for questioning access to law. Putting
‘legal geographies’ in conversation with feminist jurisprudence, moreover, serves to
forward the project of legal geography, which, as Blomley (1994) advises, must consider
the contributions of both geographical scholars and legal theorists.
6

Although Robson is speaking explicitly in terms of lesbian politics before the law, I think the
power of her heuristic tool lies in the fact that it is applicable to feminist jurisprudence and
theories of intersectionality.
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Feminist jurisprudence, with its critiques of law and legal interpretation and its social
change agenda, further breaks down the ‘geography in law’ versus the ‘law in geography’
optic. Beyond calling for a broader and more inclusive understanding of women’s lives
(Osborne and Smith, 2005) and women’s role in the construction of knowledge, including
legal knowledge, feminist consciousness, especially when in conjunction with geojurisprudence, brings theoretical insights and openings into the study of law- legal
language and practice and law’s spaces. Indeed, feminist geo-jurisprudence’s relational,
intersectional, and multilevel/scalar understanding of society, space, and language can be
applied to an interrogation into the role mediated interpretation plays in accessing law in
a particular geographic context. I discuss feminist methods and methodologies in more
detail in the next chapter.
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III.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

To answer my principle research questions, I combined multiple, complementary
methods. I utilized methodological triangulation (Yin, 2002; Denzin, 1978) in order to
approach my questions from several angles, to test the consistency and validity of my
research, and to create a broader picture of my field of research: Lexington’s legal space,
especially the aspect of this space concerned with advocating for the city’s immigrant and
non-citizen population. This triangulation entailed looking at the same research questions
from different methodological perspectives to balance and move beyond strictly
formalized interactions- for example, those occurring in interviews- (see Kearns, 2005:
195) and with the aim of developing a geography of everyday relationships and
interactions. Specifically, my methods of data collection for this research project include:
1) participant observation (and volunteering) at Maxwell Street Legal Clinic; 2)
participant observation at RFS Circuit Courthouse; and 3) in-depth semi-structured
interviews of key informants. I conducted my research during the Fall, 2008 school
semester, from September through December. This is a local, place-based research
project, and I lived and worked in the vicinity of my field, in Lexington, KY, during the
entire time of my research.

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AT LEGAL CLINIC

Site Selection: Maxwell Street Legal Clinic

There are a variety of aspects to qualitative research, including choice of setting,
access, field relations (including talking and listening), the recording of data, and, finally,
analysis of the experience (Kearns, 2005). For this research project, Maxwell Street
Legal Clinic (MSLC) was the major field site, from where I recruited informants for my
semi-structured interviews and where I acted as participant observer beginning in
September, 2008 and ongoing even after the end of my field research. The choice of this
setting was dictated by the larger goals of the research (see Kearns, 2005: 199) and by the
local, place-based scope of this project. My research questions ask about the role of
interpretation and translation in both the courtroom and courthouse themselves, but also
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within the broader legal apparatus in Lexington, KY. Because these questions inquire
into the idea of ‘legal space’, access, and publicity in a local context, it seemed obvious
that MSLC was the appropriate site for the project, especially considering the small size
of the Immigration Law community in Lexington. Not only is MSLC the only non-profit
legal clinic serving immigrant populations in Lexington, it is also one of only two such
legal clinics in the entire state of Kentucky, the other being located in Louisville.
Drawing on legal geographies and public space literatures, but also concerned with the
broader framework of citizenship and migration, my research questions target those
having legal experience with and knowledge about low English proficiency and nonEnglish speaking immigrants.
MSLC is a non-profit organization funded by private organizations and individuals
and dependent on volunteer services, even volunteer attorneys. Its volunteer pool also
includes interpreters and translators; however a majority of its staff is fluent in English
and Spanish. Founded in 1999, MSLC serves underrepresented groups, particularly lowincome clients in Central Kentucky requiring immigration-related services, including
immigration processing, refugee and asylum cases, and, in some cases, wage claims. In
the words of one of the clinic’s founders (R1, 10/08/08): “We’re here to serve the
underserved people who don’t have the resources to pay a private attorney.”
MSLC provides family-based immigration services and does not provide
employment-based services. Although they do not accept walk-in clients, they do have
open intake for clients every Wednesday from 4:00PM and 7:00PM where attorneys and
volunteers “get basic information about the client, him or herself, simple things like
name, date of birth, and so on, and then some kind of idea about what their legal problem
is” (R1, 10/08/08). These intake sheets are then reviewed later in the week, and a
decision is made as to whether MSLC can help that person or if he or she should be
“referred out” (R1, 10/08/08). In the period of approximately ten years, the clinic has
seen about 3,500 clients over the period and has dealt with about 5,000 matters. MSLC
now operates under the Kentucky Equal Justice Center and, funded by the Knight
Foundation, it runs the “Citizenship Project”, which focuses on preparation and education
towards naturalization. In 2002, the Fayette County Bar Association and the Fayette
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Circuit Court awarded MSLC an Award of Achievement for its efforts toward “Assuring
Equal Justice for All” (“Maxwell Street Legal Clinic”).
Gaining Access

Gaining access to a research site can be one of the primary obstacles involved with
doing field research (see for example Lofland, et al., 2006: 33-53). Fortunately, the size
of the legal community in Lexington (as mentioned above) made this process rather easy.
Further, connections with MSLC had been previously created with members of the
Geography Department at the University of Kentucky; the principal lawyer for the clinic
had spoken in a community forum during an Immigration and Public Space conference
hosted, in part, by my thesis advisor. When making my initial contact with the clinic
through an email query, I was able to introduce myself through common networks, and I
believe this aided in the establishment of rapport with clinic employees.
MSLC, relying heavily as it does on volunteers, has a well-organized volunteer
program.

At the beginning of semester (Fall and Spring), the clinic accepts new

volunteers and holds a volunteer orientation.

MSLC draws its volunteers from the

University of Kentucky, from regional law schools, and from members of the
community. In August, 2008, responding to a post on their website, I wrote to the
volunteer coordinator expressing my interest in being involved at the clinic as part of my
research project in Geography. I filled out both the application and the “Volunteer
Contract” (see APPENDIX A), and I was welcomed in the final volunteer slot for Fall, 2008.
The Volunteer Orientation took place on September 6, 2008 from 9:00AM until 1:00PM
and was held at the Maxwell Street Presbyterian Church next door from the clinic.
Volunteers are prepared for various positions at the clinic following this orientation and
are placed on appropriate email lists for recruitment; however, the clinic does ask
volunteers to give twenty or more hours of service before claiming the position on a
resume or Curriculum Vitae. Confidentiality, which is an important component of social
science research and data-collection (Lofland, et al., 2006: 51-53), was built in to the
volunteer agreement I made with the clinic, due to the legal code of ethics and the
sensitivity involved in many of the clients’ information.
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Participant Observation

Participant observation is a form of ethnographic research appropriate “investigation
of a small number of cases” (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2005: 248). In participant
observation, in which the researcher is the primary tool for collecting data (Hoggart, et
al., 2000: 275), “going into a social situation and looking is another way of gathering
materials about the social world” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 48). I served as a volunteer
at the Maxwell Street Legal Clinic, logging in approximately twenty hours in the capacity
of “Citizen Workshop Staff”, “Citizenship Class Instructor”, and “Human Rights
Researcher”. In addition, I participated in the re-registration for nationals of Honduras
and El Salvador who have been granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS).

As a

prerequisite for becoming a volunteer at the legal clinic, I attended “Immigration Law
101”, a 4-hour crash-course in immigration law and terminology, cultural and language
considerations, and issues of confidentiality.
There are several components of MSLC’s “Citizenship Project”, whose aim is to
guide potential, qualified citizens through the naturalization process. The full course of
the “Citizenship Project”, including the “Citizenship Workshop”, citizenship classes, and
the “New Citizens Academy”, takes place twice annually and coincides with the clinic’s
volunteer schedule, as well as with the University calendar. As a participant observer, I
obtained a peripheral membership (see Angrosino, 2007: 55) in the clinic community,
and I was most actively involved in this aspect of MSLC’s services, and I took every
chance to participate in the “Citizen Project”, about which I was informed by an email
call for volunteers. As a member of the Citizenship Workshop staff, I helped citizenship
applicants during a one-day group processing event. Before the event, I attended a
training session on September 17, 2008. In the role of the Citizenship Class instructor, I
taught U.S. history and government classes to clients preparing for their citizenship
exams. The classes were held from 6:30- 7:30 in the evening at the clinic and revolved
around themes specific to the “Naturalization Exam” given by the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, a branch of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. To attain
citizenship, applicants are required to read, write, speak, and understand “basic English”as determined through an interview and an exam, and they are asked 10 out of 96
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possible civics questions (see APPENDIX B).7 The classes I taught were “The Constitution
and the Bill of Rights” and “The Three Branches of Government”, which took place on
September 29, 2008 and October 13, 2008, respectively.

The Project Coordinator

provided me with PowerPoint presentations several days before the class, which I studied
and modified. Classes were attended by between five and ten students.
Participant observation is a method that allows social scientists to take part in the
world while also seeing and representing it (Kearns, 2005; Crang, 1997). In this way,
observations are not merely observational; they become experiences. Even though my
observation at the clinic was not daily, but depended on my involvement in particular
volunteer roles, I performed what H. Russell Bernard terms “rapid assessment
procedures” (2005: 331-332); that is, I acquainted myself with the operations of the
organization through limited engagements rather than spending months entrenched in the
field. This method was rounded out through the interviews I conducted with the MSLC
staff, and, in a short amount of time, I was able to achieve a type of “theoretic
saturation”, where “the generic features of new findings consistently replicate earlier
ones” (Angrosino, 2007: 58).
Indeed, volunteering at the Maxwell Street Legal Clinic proved worthwhile to my
research, and my roles as participant observer provided me with access to participants for
my semi-structured interviews, gained understanding of legal complexities, and a feeling
of

involvement

with

the

legal

and

immigrant

communities

in

Lexington.

Contextualizing is a major part of observation (cf. Kearns, 2005: 1993). Additionally, if
“context is everything” (Holder and Harrison, 2003: 3) in terms of legal geographies,
then it follows that a study involving legal discourse should necessarily involve a
contextualization of these discourses in their space. In the course of my research, I found
that this space can be described as discursive legal/judicial space.

My participant

observation at Maxwell Street Legal Clinic was also crucial to understanding the
geography of everyday experiences (see for example, Kearns, 2005: 195) at MSLC, as
my volunteer activities enabled me to grasp the sense of routine at the clinic. Through
participant observation, I was able to have personal contact with MSLC’s clientele, thus
7

Effective as of October 1st, 2008, the United States Center for Immigration and Citizenship
Services (USCIS) has revised the U.S. Naturalization exam. However, the changes are not very
drastic, and the exam follows the same basic format.

37

bolstering the information provided about immigrant experiences from my informants, as
well as getting to see these informants as employees in this particular setting. In the spirit
of reciprocal learning and teaching, and in line with feminist methodologies, I gave back
my time as a volunteer in exchange for the opportunity to study at MSLC, to interact with
the people there, and to interview some of its staff members and volunteers.

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AT COURTHOUSE

Site Selection: Robert F. Stephen’s Circuit Courthouse

The Robert F. Stephen’s (RFS) courthouse complex is located in downtown
Lexington at 120 N. Limestone, on the corner of Limestone and Main Street, and is
comprised of both a Circuit and a District court. The RFS complex opened in 2002 as
part of a $62 million dollar project (Lexington Herald-Leader), underwritten by the
Triangle Foundation, a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization (QUANGO),
in an entrepreneurial move to privatize government space (per personal conversation with
Dr. Rich Schein, 09/05/08). Structurally, the court complex dominates the city center,
and its plaza, replete with two fountains, serves as a place for public events and
gatherings.
For the purposes of this project, I conducted my research in the Circuit courts. I
selected the Robert F. Stephen’s Circuit Courthouse as a site for my research for many of
the same reasons I chose the Maxwell Street Legal Clinic; namely due to the themes of
my research questions and because of the research’s local focus. In Kentucky, as with
many of the southern states in the United States the circuit courthouse is a state court of
‘superior general original jurisdiction’. Here, ‘state’ refers to the scale of the law’s
jurisdiciton; state laws fall under the soverignty of the sub-national state rather than the
federal, in this case Kentucky. A ‘superior’ court is a court that hears civil and criminal
legal cases and has unlimited jurisdiction with regard to these cases, whereas the
jurisdiction of lower courts is limited to civil cases dealing with smaller monetary
amounts or cases involving less serious crimes, for example petty misdemeanors.
‘General’ laws do not fall under a specialized type of law, such as Immigration Law. As
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opposed to appellate jurisdiction, ‘original jurisdiction’ denotes a court’s right to hear
first instance cases. ‘Original jurisdiction’ signals that the decisions of the cases tried in
this court will be recognized as within the precedence of the law at the state scale without
federal oversight (per personal conversation with Atty. Diane Kinslow, 10/10/08).
Although one is required to pass through metal detectors before entering the building, the
courthouse is open to the public, as are a majority of the courtrooms, including those
holding arraignment hearings. Case dockets are openly displayed in the courtroom lobby
on the ground floor.
In addition to its courtrooms, the RFS Circuit Courthouse houses several
administrative offices, including Court Interpreting Services, which falls under ‘Court
Services’ on the left hand side of Figure 1 below:

Source: courts.ky.gov

To promote equal access before the law, the Kentucky Court of Justice provides
interpreting services for individuals with limited English and for those who are deaf or
hard of hearing, or are unable to speak at all (“Kentucky Court of Justice”).

The

Kentucky Court of Justice has qualified interpreters for several languages and certified
interpreters for the Spanish language. The availability of interpreting services is directly
related to the Lexington population- Spanish speakers being the largest non-English
speaking population in Lexington.

The Division of Interpreting Services of the
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Administrative Office of the Courts appoints an interpreter to meet the specified needs of
judges, circuit court clerks, court administrators and other Court of Justice personnel, and
are either requested or assigned. Interpreting services are not, however, available for
attorneys.
Participant Observation

As stated by Michael Angrosino (2007: 61), “One of the most characteristic
applications of observational research is that which is carried out in public spaces.” The
state courthouse is one such public space.8 I began my passive observation (see McCall,
1978) at the Robert F. Stephens Courthouse with the idea that “language and law are
close bedfellows” (Shuy, 2007). This method combined observation of court proceedings
with readings of material culture and its records and was directed toward the questions of
this research project related to the composition of (public) legal space; the relationships
between legal space and legal discourse; and the effects of these relationships,
particularly in terms of access to the law through interpretation and interpretation
services and how this space of law, as a public space, thus enforces or denies belonging.
On three occasions during the months of my fieldwork, I attended arraignment hearings
at the Robert F. Stephen’s Circuit Courthouse in downtown Lexington. Open to the
public, these sessions are held on Tuesdays beginning at 1:00 PM in Courtroom 3. These
kinds of proceedings “afford an excellent view of administrative-clinical court
organization and the diffusion of judicial responsibility” as well as “lend[ing] themselves
particularly well to the observational study of situational or interactional factors in
official discretion” (McCall, 1978: 108).

These observations in a “constant and

controlled setting” (ibid.) lead to an understanding of what one informant called “more of
the same” (R6, 11/17/08), or what criminologists term, “assembly-line justice” (see for
example McCall, 1978).
My participant obsevation was recorded using filed notes, which included
methodological notes, descriptive notes, and some analytic notes (Emerson, et al., 1995;
Bernard, 2002)

bringing theory and field observation.

8

My observations were not

“The local court system…represents a substantial public empire”, as George McCall (1978:
105) would have it.
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systematic, nor were they systematically recorded. Rather, the descriptive notes were at
the heart of the courtroom observation, and here I recorded, through watching and
listening, processes, behaviors, and details of the the environment. I approached this
method as someone just entering this space, with little guidance, mostly just to get a
‘feel’ for the place.

While at the hearings, I observed for information related to

interpretation, and I also documented the composition of court subjects and courtroom
attendees (the publicity), exchanges between judges, lawyers, translators and/or
interpreer, and/or palintifs, defendants, and evidence of the courtroom work group (see,
for example, Shichor and Sechrest, 1996). Meanwhile, I also paid attention to the
relationship between actors and the space itself.
The observation of court proceedings led me, as participant observer, into other
spaces of the courthouse within RFS Circuit Courthouse, where I conducted further
readings and document the law-in-action. In addition to the court proceedings, I had the
opportunity to shadow a staff court interpreter following our interview (11/17/08), and, in
this way, gained access to other aspects of the courhouse space and practices involving
interpretation/translation therein, including court clerk procedures. For me, this was
actually a more rewarding and more telling experience than the hearings.

It was

interesting to see how this court interpreter moved through the spaces of the courthouse
with ease and a sense of authority, as opposed to the masses waiting in line in front of the
clerks window or to see an attorney to make a deal on their traffic violation.9 He was
also quick to point out to me my own position ‘on the other side of the law’. For
example, while observing the traffic violation procedure, where the legal subject can
negotiate his/her ticket directly with a prosecutor in lieu of a hearing before a judge, I
positioned myself in back of the room with those people waiting in line rather than with
the lawyers, the deputy, and the interpreter. During this occasion, I also witnessed
another form of interpretation- sign language interpretation for the hearing impaired. I
9

McCall (1978: 103) also notes that, in the courthouse, “Dress is relatively important; as one
lawyer put it, around the courthouse one can usually tell which people are the lawyers- they are
the ones whose coats match their pants. Even wearing a jacket and tie is too informal in that
setting for a lawyer.” The differences in standards (of appearance, demeanor, etc.) between the
legal culture (likened to those of a “middle-class professional/business community” by McCall
(ibid.)) and the majority of legal subjects crowding the courthouse corridors were also apparent in
my observation.
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also followed a woman wanting to cancel a Protective Order, as she was navigated
through the courthouse. She needed to ask where in the courthouse to go to take care of
this; but, interestingly, I found, she could not question the court interpreter directly (even
though he could have easily answered her inquiry). Rather, the interpreter was required
to direct her to the clerk, and then interpret the question and answer interaction between
the woman and the clerk. Due to his familiarity with the courthouse space, the interpreter
was able to draw attention to how the structure of the building and the signage therein
served to regulate the behavior of the public. He showed me a water fountain, nestled
behind a wall and next to a sign enjoining, “Authorized Personnel Only”. As he tells it,
rarely does anyone aside from courthouse employees use this water fountain. These
observations complemented both the participant observation at MSLC and the semistructured interviews with key informants involved in some way in the Lexington/ greater
Eastern and Central Kentucky legal scene.

I N - D E P T H S E M I - S T R U C T U R E D I N T E R V I E W S O F K EY I N F O R M A N T S

In addition to participant observation and informal conversations at MSLC and the
courthouse I conducted a total of seven in-depth interviews with key informants. I
recruited interviewees using existing networks, centered around my main research sites.
Because my research is concerned with the public-ness of law and access to legal spaces,
I had proposed to interview several public defenders in Lexington. I was especially
interested in exploring their understandings of the ‘public’ they defend. Unfortunately,
despite phone calls, emails, and a written letter, I was unable to gain access to the Public
Defender’s Office. Public defenders were also outside of the networks I used to recruit
interviewees. When I mentioned to the attorneys that I did interview the difficulty I was
encountering with gaining access to the Public Defender’s Office, they mentioned that
the attorneys there are overburdened with case loads and suffering from recent state
budget cuts.
The interviewees for this research project are all legal employees of some variety who
deal with issues involving law and interpretation in the Lexington area and include: (2)
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certified interpreters, (2) attorneys, (1) legal clinic employee (2) employees of local legal
services, as listed in the below table:
Table 4: “Key Informants”

R#

POSITION/TITLE

TYPE OF
INTERVIEW

DATE
INTERVIEWED

R1

Attorney

In-Person

10/08/08

R2

Interpreter

Phone Interview

10/13/08

R3

Legal Clinic
Employee

In-Person

10/17/08

R4

Director

In-Person

10/20/08

R5

Advocate

In-Person

11/11/08

R6

Advocate

In-Person

11/17/08

R7

Attorney

In-Person

12/17/08

Except one, all of my interviewees speak English and Spanish. Each of these interviews
was concerned with the question of language and access to the law, and I used a similar
interview guide for the interviews, adapting it based on the subject position of the
interviewee (see

APPENDIX C).

I used probes to remind me to cover topics related to my

research questions and to pursue items that may not be mentioned (see Lofland, et al.,
2006). In doing so, I was cognizant of what was not mentioned in the interviews. Before
conducting my first interview, I went over the interview guide, and I performed a mock
interview with my thesis advisor in order to get an idea of what might be brought up
during the interviews and to hone the questions and probes in the guide.
The interviews were held at the field research sites, in the place of the interviewees
employment (in many cases, either of the two research sites), or in public places of the
interviewees’ choice. In one instance, however, I conducted an interview over the phone.
Telephone interviews are more limited than face-to-face interviews because there is an
absence of visual cues, and, thus, as an interviewer, I had fewer tools for communication
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(see de Leeuw, 2008). Still, as this was mainly an information-based interview with an
interpreter, and because I was unable to schedule a personal meeting with her, a phone
interview sufficed for the purposes of this project. Aside from this phone interview, I
recorded the data using a tape recorder and was able to secure signatures on the consent
forms. Although I asked for a half hour of time from each informant, these interviews
lasted from 45 minutes to two hours in length. My interview style involved letting the
informant lead and probing following silences. Among other issues, these interviews
allow me to understand:
∗

The motivation and reasoning behind the interviewees’ choice of career.

∗

The certification, education, or requirements necessary to their line of work.

∗

The structure of the legal system, including laws, statutes, and protocols, and the
availability of resources.

∗

The types of cases that require interpretation and/or translation services, and the
kinds of clients that seek these services.

∗

Perceptions of challenges/difficulties for legal subjects in terms of access to the
law, focusing on language access, as related to their job experience and the
experiences of their clientele, as well as to their own subject-position.

∗

Insights into the legal experiences of immigrants or non-citizens in the greater
Lexington area and relationships between citizenship status and criminality.

∗

Changes in the Lexington legal space over the last decade in terms of language
availability and accessibility.

∗

Positioned opinions of the legal system’s ability to meet the needs of the greaterLexington community.

∗

Ideas or strategies for improvements in the legal system to best meet the needs of
the community.

As Valerie Gilchrist (1992: 71) explains, “Key informants differ from other
informants by the nature of their position in a culture and by their relationship with the
researcher”.

Historically, ‘key informants’ were members providing anthropologists

access to a tribe, but the term can also refer to those who “possess special knowledge,
status, or communication skills” (ibid.: 75). The attorneys, interpreters/translators, and
legal advocates who were interviewed for the purposes of my research project were ‘key
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informants’ in that they provided me with access to the legal field and its language and
logics, a discursive space that I would otherwise become lost in. Although one of my
informants, a legal advocate, admitted his feelings of incompetence in legalese due to his
non-lawyer positionality, he nevertheless had spent decades in the field and was able to
self-educate and learn through the experience inherent in his employment position.
While I recognize that each of my interviewees occupies a service- provider and not
receiver positionality, the informants selected for these interviews nonetheless gave me
an insiders’ view of the Lexington (and greater-Kentucky) legal system.10 Due to their
everyday dealings with or on behalf of the specified population, and in some cases based
on their own experiences, they were also able to relay information regarding the
experiences of their clients and client-populations- the service receivers. Because I
approached my interviewees from the outside-in, I was also able to glean some of the
obstacles and difficulties in attempting to encounter these professionals and learn about
their services.

The perspectives and observations provided by the informants/

interviewees for this project, added valuable insight into my own observations of the
Lexington legal space. Not only did these informants point out to me things that I may
not have noticed without the influence of their viewpoints, they also enabled me to ‘read’
the spaces I was encountering in light of their experiences, occupations, and training
backgrounds.
The relationships between me, the researcher, and the informants for my study were
contingent upon my positionality as participant observer and my expressed desires to
combine sometimes seemingly abstract research with tangible social change. Because I
became acquainted with all of my informants through my association as active volunteer
at Maxwell Street Legal Clinic, my informants were willing to share their knowledge
with me, to grant me access to important documents and secondary resources, and to
provide me with contacts for additional interviewees. From my experience, I would
agree with Gil Valentine (1997: 113) that “[s]haring the same background or a similar
identity to your informant can have a positive effect, facilitating the development of a
rapport between interviewer and interviewee and thus producing a rich, detailed
10

The “border guard’s question” (Honig, 2001: 52) is the question of the foreigner (Derrida,
2000).
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conversation based on empathy and mutual respect and understanding” (see also Doucet
and Mauthner, 2008). As volunteer with peripheral membership at MSLC, I was further
able to develop and maintain relationships with those participating in my research; thus,
follow-ups for clarification on certain points or questions regarding legal documents and
procedures were facilitated by the very nature of the researcher-informant relationships.
Attorneys, especially, act as gatekeepers (see Burgess, 1984) of the law,11 but my
field relations with them, or my ability to relate to those in the field, were ameliorated by
my interests and also by my own level of education. Just as know knowing the language
(Bernard, 2005: 338-342) is essential when in a far and distant land, so, too, is an
educated English lexicon helpful when speaking with professionals.12 Interviewing key
informants in the legal field, however, was a balancing act between knowledge and
naïveté. Because legalese would be considered a language of its own to some, I did not
have to cultivate “deliberate conscious naïveté” (Kvale, 1996: 199; see also Angrosino,
2007: 57). Still, my naïveté added to the richness of my interviews and allowed me to
question what I took for granted. Moreover, rather than assuming that I knew what they
were talking about, my informants were willing to go into long detours to describe legal
terms and applications.

With each interview (and coupled with my participant

observation), as I began to understand how the U.S. and Kentucky legal systems work, I
sought out alternative explanations from my informants (see Bernard, 2005: 430). Not
only did this enhance my own knowledge of law, but it also gave me insight into the
logics behind my interviewees’ thinking. Fortunately, I was also able to contact my
sister, an attorney, for clarification when I found myself confused following an interview
with a legal professional. My experiences during these interviews demonstrated some of
the difficulties involved with social scientists researching the law.

11

This was, perhaps, my experience with the Public Defender’s Office.
Speaking in terms of hermeneutics, or interpretive analysis, Bernard (2002: 451) says, “You
can't see the connections among symbols if you don't know what the symbols are and what they
are supposed to mean”. This kind of analysis involves “deep involvement with the culture,
including an intimate familiarity with the language” (ibid.).

12
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ANALYSIS, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND LIMITATIONS

“[A]nalysis is ultimately quantitative. It starts before you collect the data- you have to have some
ideas about what you are going to study- and it continues throughout any research effort. As you
develop ideas, you test them against your observations; your observations may then modify your
ideas, which then need to be tested again, and so on.”
-H. Russell Bernard, 2002: 429
Data Analysis: Coding

Following Megan Cope’s suggestions for coding (2003; 2005), I analyzed the
transcripts of my semi-structured interviews and field notes from observations, what she
terms “self-generated documents” (ibid.: 448), in order to identify recurrent categories
and patterns and the intersection of multiple themes across interviews (Gibbs, 2007;
Cope, 2003; 2005; Jackson, 2001) and to move through different forms of analysis to
interpretation for meaning (Kvale, 1996). I treated my interviews as a type of narration
(Kvale, 1996: 199), and, because of the importance of legal discourse to the research, I
honed in on and used what Bernard (2005: 471-76) calls “exemplar quotes”. I attempted
to note and consider the silences, gaps, and to read in-between the lines. Upon more indepth analysis, I was also able to identify strategies and tactics (Strauss, 1987) in relation
to the major themes, especially as my interview questions were geared toward the
problematic of access and inclusion in the Lexington legal system. When naming a
difficulty, a majority of my informants quickly qualified their responses with: 1) an
improvement they had witnessed in the time they had been employed in their particular
position, whether something they had themselves initiated or which their job was
benefiting from; 2) a proposal for change that they themselves or colleagues were in the
process of enacting on a variety of scales; or 3) a possibility for improvement that they
could envision taking place in the future barring the necessary resources and work. In
labeling these types of responses as ‘strategies’ and simultaneously naming particular
strategies or sets of tactics, I was able to connect various codes in a web of themes (Cope,
2003; Straus and Corbin, 1990; Strauss, 1987). I found that this web of interconnection
only became richer when coupled with the issues mentioned as barriers to meaningful
access in the legal system, and this process enabled me to link my interview questions
and respondents’ answers directly to the research questions governing the project and,
47

thus, to the literature and theory informing the initial inquiry (Cope, 2003, 455; Kvale,
1996: 194).
Being in the world, manifested in the participant observation component of the
research, aided in the coding of the world (see Cope, 2005) and the word. The primary
text materials of the interview transcripts did prove valuable in filling in knowledge gaps
from the field and vice versa (cf. Cope, 2003: 446). Then, my coding strategies allowed
me to assess the qualitative data, complementing the triangulation of methods (see
Kearns, 2005). Because I had targeted key legal informants, my choice had limited my
scope; but, rather than a downfall of the research, I saw it as a means for focus in my
research analysis.
Feminist Epistemology in Geography and Knowledge Production

My “coding practices” (Crang, 2005: 225), or what I automatically looked for- what
stood out to me, did help to clarify the epistemologies guiding my research and
subsequent analysis and write-up- that is, in every stage of the research.

The

epistemology helped shape the research questions, the choice of methods, and it played a
role when collecting and analyzing data. “A feminist epistemology,” proposes Megan
Cope (2002: 50),”does not require the use of specific methods, but it does require critical
reflection on the use of all methods of analysis and interpretation” (my emphasis). This
reflexivity in research (Al-Hindi and Kawabata, 2002; Cope, 2002; England, 1994)
enabled me to reflect on my research and to recognize that some parts of the research- for
example, the water fountain incident- were in fact ‘data’, and could contribute to the
overall aims of the project. Likewise, a feminist epistemology led me to consider my
own body and subject position in relation to my research (Al-Hindi and Kawabata, 2002;
Bain and Nash, 2005). A feminist approach to both the field and the collected ‘data’
involves considerations, not just of sex and gender, but notices all forms of oppression
and hierarchy (Anderson, 1995; hooks, 1993). Extending my views and perspectives in
this way allowed me to see the intersectionality between and among different forms of
oppression in society, and in the law more specifically, and it forced me as researchers to
gather and to analyze research data in manners sensitive to these interconnections. In
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short, a feminist approach demands serious and critical reevaluation regarding knowledge
production and the way we ‘do’ research and geography (Cope, 2002).
Note on Feminist Legal Methods

Because of the centrality of feminist jurisprudence, even feminist geo-jurisprudence,
to this research project, it is necessary to note the distinctions between ‘methods’ from a
social science point of view and feminist legal ‘methods’. In order to do so, I perform a
close-reading of Katharine Bartlett’s (1990) essay, “Feminist Legal Methods”, which
appeared in the Harvard Law Review. As ‘doing law’ involves primarily interpretation
and analysis of legal discourse, legal methods are more can be understood more as
epistemologies with methodological implications,13 rather than methods of data collection
like interviews, focus groups, or participant observation. In fact, as Bartlett (ibid.: 843)
explains, feminist legal methods have been critiqued as a politics, not a method, and this
is connected to the American legal system’s assumption that “method and substance have
different functions”.14 She argues that method and substance are “somewhat” distinct,
but that all legal methods, including feminist legal methods, shape substance (ibid.: 84347).
In Bartlett’s opinion, feminist legal methods include many of the same modes of
thinking and reasoning as feminist epistemologies more generally, including “asking the
woman question”; “practical reasoning”; “consciousness raising”; and positionality. At
the foundation of Bartlett’s feminist method is the “woman question”, which “asks about
exclusion” (ibid.: 847) of both women and “excluded groups” (ibid.: 831), and provokes
legal practitioners to confront their assumptions and to adopt new perspectives receptive
to forms of oppression within law and legal practice taking into account experiences and
needs. In law, asking the woman question involves asking how existing legal standards
13

“A theory of knowledge that assumes the existence of objective truth accessible through rational or
empirical inquiry, for example, has different methodological implications than a theory that treats
knowledge as a question of special privilege, or one that denies its existence altogether” (Bartlett,
1990: 832).
14
“Rules of legal method, like rules of legal procedure, are supposed to insulate substantive rules from
arbitrary application. Substantive rules define the rights and obligations of individuals and legal
entities (what law is); rules of method and procedure define the steps taken in order to ascertain and
apply that substance (how to invoke the law and to make it work)” (Bartlett, 1990: 843-44).
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and concepts marginalize and identifying and challenging existing elements of legal
doctrine, and I would add, practice. Above all, these methods are intended to “shape
one’s view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform” (ibid.: 830) as well as “to
expose those features and how they operate, and to suggest how they might be corrected”
(ibid.: 837).
With that being said, there are some common methods used by feminist legal theorists
in order to approach and explore law. These include:
∗
∗
∗

Discourse analysis/ deconstruction: moving from questions of equality to
critiques of the law itself (see for example Butler, 1990).
Case studies: examining law in action (for a classic example, see analysis of the
Sears trial in Williams, 1989, to which I refer in the previous chapter).
Ethnography: If the law is “everywhere” but also changing and specific in its
effects on individual lives, then how do women (and others) ‘experience’ law in
the everyday? (see Ewick and Sibley, 1998)

Both during data-collection and the resulting analysis, I kept in mind the ways in which
feminist and feminist theorists approach law as a topic and a site of research. While I did
not perform specific case studies, I did treat this project as a kind of ethnography of legal
discourse (see Conley and O’Barr, 1990), and I sought to understand law as it is
experienced by the legal practitioners interviewed for this study. As key informants, the
interview respondents were also able to provide me with some insight into the
experiences of their clientele. I introduced Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
Executive Order 13166 in order to push against this legislation and to interrogate its
effectiveness (and the possibility of meaningful legal access) through the insertion of
everyday voices and experiences with law.
Possible Limitations of Research Methods

The major limitation to this research, as mentioned above, can be put very simply: I
am a “lay person” (Conley and O’Barr, 1990), not a lawyer (see Moore, 1993). This
positionality not only meant a steep learning curve during every stage of the research
process, but it also may have affected my ability to gain access to potential informants
and information. However, what on one hand could be characterized as a drawback in
the research could, on the other hand, be seen as an asset. My un-familiarity with legal
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language, rules of conduct and procedures, statutes, etc. forced the informants in this
research project to explain in detail the concepts they mentioned during interviews. This
provided for richer and longer interviews, and it allowed me to see how the law and law’s
history was interpreted differently across my interviews.

Also, my lack of legal

experience and the newness of the legal spaces involved in this research gave me ‘fresh
eyes’ in my observations and may have diminished some of the observational bias (see
Angrosino, 2007: 61) in the project. Like any research project, some listening and
reading biases (see for example Cope, 2003) are inevitable.
My analysis draws heavily on my interviews, and especially in the section entitled,
“Language Space: Interpretation, Mediation, and Legal-Subject Formation”, the research
could benefit from additional time spent observing in the RFS courthouse field site and,
even, a more systematic approach to the site and the data therein. Yet, in order to collect
richer data specific to interpretation practices, I would perhaps need to have better
contacts and attempt to sit in on a different kinds of courtroom (for example, a trial of
some sort), or follow a specific legal-subject through the entire court process. These
were beyond the scope of this research. Another option would have been to focus on a
particular judge and document the atmosphere of his or her courtroom over a much
longer period of time. One way to have accomplished something like that would have
been through participation in ‘court watch’ with the Kentucky Domestic Violence
Association.

Although the possibility for doing this emerged following one of my

interviews, the project, as far as I know, has yet to come to fruition. Still, because of the
kinds in-depth interview conducted, I was able to begin to understand this space through
a combination of interview testimony and my own observations.
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IV. BARRIERS, GAPS, DISTANCE, MEDIATION:
LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION & ACCESS TO LAW’S SPACE
Language becomes a barrier when, for one, service providers have difficulty
serving the needs of “Limited Language Proficiency” (LLP) populations (Peterson, 2001:
1). As many of the studies involving individuals with LLP and their access to services
show (Peterson, 2001; Monroe and Shirazian, 2004; Chen, et al., 2007; Snowden, et al.,
2007), these individuals frequently experience disparities in access to government
services- whether delayed service or differences in service and service quality- which
could be characterized as ‘uneven’ as compared to those with English proficiency. With
my research, I have found that, among other ‘inconveniences’, LLPs in legal spaces have
been asked to have their friends or family members interpret for them at the clerk’s desk,
or have been provided the same interpreter for both parties in the adversarial legal
system.

Attorneys and other legal service providers, even interpreters, may not be

proficient in the language the LLP might need, and they may be insensitive to the
language needs of an LLP legal-subject or possible language/cultural nuances.
Moreover, language interpreters are not provided in every step of the legal process, or in
every legal possibility, for that matter. Disparities to language access also exist, in part,
due to often unseen, but nevertheless irretrievable, differences involved in language
interpretation, especially as manifested in a legal context. These differences are best
understood and conveyed through a spatial conception (distance and proximity) of
interpretation within the framework of legal encounter and relational and mediated
identity-formation.

LLPS, NON-SPANISH SPEAKERS
AND GAPS IN INTERPRETATION QUALITY AND ACCESSIBILITY

“Such is the power of language: that which is woven of spaces elicits spaces, gives itself space
through an originary opening and removes space to take it back into language.”
-Michel Foucault, 2007: 166

Not only has the role of language in identity formation been relatively neglected by
geographers (see Valentine, Sporton, et al., 2008), but also, a majority of the studies
involving language access and services (all outside the discipline of geography) are
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concerned with the Health Industry and medical services.15 This is particularly so, it
seems, because a lack of access to health services can prove life threatening. When, for
instance, a patient cannot communicate their medical problem, the connections between
language barriers and barriers to access become quite apparent and can have fatal results.
The legal implications of language-related access are different, yet, arguably, no less
severe. There are life-threatening and life-altering consequences to legal actions. These
are not confined to the fatal outcomes of certain criminal cases, but can also result from,
for example, the failure to retrieve an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) in a domestic
violence occurrence, the loss of parental rights and the subsequent removal of children
from the home, etc.
Those whose do not speak, write, or read English proficiently may be similar in that
their primary language is one other than English, which is the language in which U.S. law
is written and practiced. However, there is a danger in lumping all non-English speakers
into one category as ‘other’ because it elides the differences in experiences between
different non-English native tongues.

While the policy language discussed above

essentializes the non-English or low-proficiency English speaker as the ‘LLP’, there are
disparities in access to interpretation and interpretation quality amongst LLP individuals.
When asked to describe disparities in interpretation services in Lexington, one
interviewee (R7, 12/17/08) responded:
For Spanish-speakers, my impression is that they are getting decent
interpretation…in the courts. Non-Spanish speakers, because they don’t have
staff interpreters, they’re relying on certified and lower levels of interpreters
outside of that [certified interpreter] system. And that’s, I think, where the huge
gaps are.
The availability of these services in Lexington points out that all LLPs are not the same,
not just because all languages are not the same, but also because there are a limited
number of languages with certification programs for interpreters; contract or community
interpreters may not be of the same caliber as more highly qualified staff interpreters.
Because of differences in levels of certification and in the availability of interpreters,
15

In this study, I found that language access to medical services is also an issue in Lexington, KY.
Kentucky Equal Justice Center has as one of its responsibilities the translating of medical service
pamphlets and educational materials in an attempt to mitigate the troubles caused by
interpretation/translation in this arena.
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there are “gaps” in quality of interpretation provided. The possibilities for meaningful
access to law and legal services, then, vary depending on the individual’s primary
language. If the individual speaks, writes, and reads English proficiently, then he or she
does require language services in order to communicate in the English-language-based
court system. In Lexington, where the Kentucky Court of Justice employs Spanish staff
interpreters, if the individual is a Spanish-speaking LLP, then the interpretation quality
might be better than a non-Spanish, non-English speaker.
For the legal system, interpreters are a resource. In order to be able to provide
interpreters, there must be people available who speak the language required for the LLP
individual/ legal subject. The interviewee above continued:
…And I worry about…for instance, we had a human trafficking case last year,
where we had four victims who were Chinese-speaking, Mandarin. And it was
very difficult for us to find interpreters, Mandarin-speaking interpreters. And,
when speaking to one of the interpreters through a corporate interpretation
program, he talked about being called down to Lexington and other areas to
interpret.
The problematic of interpretation involves not only local needs (cf. White, 2002), but also
local resources.

If an interpreter cannot be found locally for the source language

required, one will be brought in, or “called down” (to the “New” Lexington and other
southern places) because federal law mandates that interpreters be provided. Like the
Mandarin interpreter mentioned here, one the Spanish interpreter I interviewed for this
study described how she travels constantly because of the lack of federally-certified
interpreters at both the state and national scales. Bringing in interpreters from out of state
is not without expense, and perhaps this contributes to the stigmas about the cost of
language accessibility discussed below. Indeed, there is a geography to interpretation in
that it an encounter of people and places in a specific locality.
As interview continues, it reveals that the “gaps” in both interpretation, and
access, and the possibility for meaningful access grow when the language required by the
LLP legal subject gets further outside of the certified interpretation system and its list of
qualified interpreters. Mandarin is more widely spoken than some indigenous languages,
and it was “very difficult” to get a Mandarin interpreter:
…Cause Mandarin’s pretty common. Once you get outside of those languages, I
think you’re gonna have some pretty crappy interpreting. For instance, we have a
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lot of Guatemalan clients, who…Spanish is not their primary language; they
speak an indigenous language, and it’s extremely hard to find interpretation at all
for those clients. I mean, we [MSLC] have a hard time. And so, the court will
use Spanish, because…I think that’s what we all have to do, or what we rely on,
but you can tell there’s misunderstandings going on.
When the local language need cannot be met, not because interpretation services are
denied, but because there is a lack of interpreters able to perform the job, then not only
attorneys, but even the courts have to make compromises. These compromises wider
even further the “gaps” discussed above. The repercussions of this are of the legal
variety and can have serious life-altering consequences for, say those involved in human
trafficking, or, in another example given by this interviewee, a father at risk of losing his
parental rights, in part due to the confusion of language gaps and barriers. The use of
Spanish as a middle-ground between the interchange of an indigenous language and
English, beyond interpretation, speaks to the geography of languages in a post-colonial
world (see Said, 1990). The indigenous legal subjects mentioned in this interview are
thrice-removed from the language of U.S. law and its practitioners. Interpretation in this
case occurs from the source language to an intermediary language (Spanish) to English
(the target language) and from English, back to Spanish, to the target language of the
non-Spanish speaking LLP. The more languages involved, the greater the degree of
error, miscommunication, misunderstanding, and loss of meaning. The more meaning
lost in interpretation, the greater the barriers and the less meaningful the legal access.

NAVIGATIONS IN LAW: LANGUAGE, PROXIMITY, AND ACCESS

“If he was already speaking our language, with all that that implies, if we already
shared all that is shared with a language, would the foreigner still be a foreigner?”
-Jacques Derrida, 2000: 17

In a legal context, specifically in a U.S. legal context, the term “language minority”, a
term adopted by Susan Berk-Selingson (2002) in her anthropological study of the
bilingual courtroom and the role of court interpreters in the judicial process, captures the
subject and spatial positioning of the LLP individual in discursive, legal space and law’s
material spaces (that is, in legal offices and n the courthouse/courtroom). For, the legal
subject with low-level English-proficiency or lacking English language knowledge
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completely, is not just limited, but is in the minority in these spaces. ‘Minority’, though
it has fallen out of use among politically-correct circles in its designation of ethnic and
racial categorization,16 speaks to aural, if not ethnic or racial, isolation and exclusion17 of
the low-level or non-English speaker amidst an English language-based law and Englishspeaking practitioners of that law.

‘Language minority’ holds currency in a legal

geography because it emphasizes the barriers and difficulties posed by language in the
Department of Justice and other federal and local agencies more than the dry, codified
terminology of policy documents.
It is my contention that the heuristics of distance and proximity (cf. Atkins, et al.,
2006; Manderson, 2006) are also useful devices for talking about the ways in which
language barriers and the practice of interpretation force a divide between insiders and
outsiders to the law. Language and law’s language create gaps and erect a boundary for
the language minority, or LLP individual, and prevent the attainment of equal and
meaningful access before the law despite agency regulations and Civil Rights code. As
law and space are actually aspects of one another (Blomley, et al., 2001), the way that
law affects language is, in part, a spatial effect resulting from distance, or lack of
language proximity. What role does language, including legal language play in gaining
or barring access to the law? When asked about the possibility difficulties faced by the
language minority as legal subject, a lawyer-respondent (R1, 10/08/08) had this to say:
If you’re talking specifically about Immigration Law, it’s a foreign animal. I
could explain stuff to you that you may not understand the first time around. If
you came to me and said, “I just married a guy from Mexico, and we want to
sponsor him for residency status” and I explained to you the procedures… in a
few minutes, your head would explode, and you would say, “This is too much
detail”, and it is. But, I give people the big picture, and, as we proceed through
the various steps that you have to take, you know, they become more comfortable
with it, and they begin to understand it a little more.
Law has its own language, and it is itself alien, a “foreign animal”, even for those at
16

And I agree with this, especially because ‘minority’ when it signals ‘non-white’ is not always
the proper designation. Non-whites, when classified together in this categorization, are not
always in the minority, and it is contextually differentiated. In the case of U.S. law- before the
law- English prevails both in legal codification and practice; thus, non-English languages are
always in the minority. When discussing and thinking about ethnicity and race, minority
designation can remove agency from individuals and groups. Here, I adopt the term ‘minority’ in
order to draw attention to power relations within the operating logics and mechanisms of law.
17
Perhaps exclusion in aural space or soundscapes (cf. Ehrkamp, 2006), even.
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‘home’ within the law. For the native English-speaker, U.S. law, written and practiced in
English, is broadly speaking, “strange and familiar at the same time” (Honig, 2001: 31)
because law uses a technical language, or legalese. In the U.S., then, it is doubly, or even
triply (in the case of indigenous language speakers discussed above), removed from those
who do not speak English or speak limited English or English as a second language.
There is room for further distance and difference (gaps and barriers) in the quality of
access with the addition of another modality of interpretation before law. In the case of
LLP legal subjects, not only do attorneys interpret the law (legalese), but also court
interpreters, and perhaps attorneys, interpret the English language.
Moreover, different areas of law, for example Civil, Criminal, or Immigration Law,
require their own set of understandings; and law, particularly Immigration Law, is always
changing. Not even attorneys are knowledgeable about every aspect of law, not even in
Kentucky where there are no mandatory specialization requirements, or specialty areas of
the law, which differs on a state-to-state basis. It can create even further confusion and
problems for the legal subject when an attorney takes on a case or an area of law in which
he or she is not qualified. Especially with Immigration Law, “if you don’t do it regularly,
you can really mess people up” (R7, 12/17/08). In this way, Immigration Law might be
equated to “Alice in Wonderland”, “a whole other world” whose rules and systems of
logic do not apply to other areas of law (R7, 12/17/08):
Because there’s so few people who do it [Immigration Law], there’s not this kind
of foundation of knowledge. You know, we all have families, we all know people
who have gone through divorce; we have that common history of knowing about
Family Law even though we may not be a lawyer who does that.
Due to the specialization and professionalization of law, attorneys and legal practitioners
act as gatekeepers to understanding, and their assistance aids in a legal subject’s
possibility of gaining more familiarity with law’s territory. This is especially so because
it is not always clear how, where, or when to access law- “It’s not that it’s [information
about the law] hidden; it’s just not obvious where to find it” (R1, 10/08/08). Law is
contradictory and paradoxical no matter the subject position of the non-expert who is
approaching the law and attempting to enter its spaces.
Law is not only an impositional (Honig, 2001) space laid onto, or imposed upon, the
spaces within the jurisdiction; law is a discursive space, stitched into the operations of
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everyday life, and the borders of this space are words- written and spoken. Access to
law, then, is admitted or barred by language. When thinking about the law in this way,
attention to the geographical dimensions of law and language shows how socio-legal
relations are mutually constituted spatially and legally. The above interview continues:
…But, it is difficult, and it is complex… and, if you get outside of Immigration
Law, like criminal defense, um, if somebody’s in trouble or accused of some
crime- misdemeanor or felony, or whatever- uh, they’ve got a real problem
because the system is, is very…different from what they’re used to, um, it’s very
procedure-oriented and…and very evidence-oriented, and in their cases, uh in
their countries where they come from, a lot of times that’s not the way it works.
The way it works is that, a lot of times, is you pay somebody and you get off or
you get a favor done, or whatever, so it’s different, a different situation, and they
look at authority in a very much, in a different way than we do. Their
expectations are much different because of what they’ve come from and what
they’ve experienced.
From the point-of-view of the LLP (the question of the stranger), language as a barrier to
meaningful access to the law is also multi-layered and multi-scalar in its complexity. As
the “Policy Guidelines” mentioned above espouse, these barriers to understanding
involve not only the exercising of rights and the accessibility to benefits and services, but
an understanding of ‘wrongs’, that is, compliance with enforced laws.
When it comes to immigration and naturalization, for example, the extent of civics
and historical integration goes as far as the one hundred or so questions required for the
U.S. Naturalization Exam and the efforts of such programs as the “Citizenship Project”.
The rest is left to self-education and experience. Still, there is much talk in law and
society along the lines that “The law is pretty much common sense” (R1, 10/08/08). But,
this begs the question: Whose common sense? To whom does the law appear open in this
way? In addition to the complexity of a legal understanding are cultural and historical
dimensions of law, especially with the scholarship forged by cultural theorists like
Edward Said (1979; 1993), which presses that we cannot consider language without
culture and vice versa. This is of notable importance with concern to the language
minority as legal subject because the linkages between language and culture are often a
matter of cultural competence. This cultural space, or the need for additional cultural
interpretation/translation, pertains to negotiations, not only of language, but also to law
and law’s language and logic. Yet, as Supreme Court Justice and legal philosopher
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Oliver Holmes (1944:1) stated, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience.”
Thinking about law from the angle of spatiality and language barriers sheds light one
of a number of Catch-22s in the law. While “ignorance of the law is not an excuse” (R1,
10/08/08), for LLP individuals in the U.S., education of the law- at least to a compatible
level of English-speaking legal subjects- requires knowledge of English and/or the knowhow to find an adequate attorney in addition to a degree of ‘cultural competency’ and,
possibly, the funds to hire a private interpreter:
…So, for a lot of folks, any contact with the legal system is gonna be difficult,
especially if you don’t have any money…. If you can afford to hire an attorney
and an interpreter, if you don’t speak English, then, you know, you can, can make
your way through. But, if you lack money, especially if you lack money, uh, and
if you lack the language skills, it’s gonna be… well, it’s as if I went to China, and
got into trouble over there, I’m lost; I’ve got no idea what the system is like
except what I’ve seen in movies, so… It’s a completely different world.
Law is less indebted to logic than to history and to societal norms; hence, there is another
remove for the language minority before the law as discussed previously. This adds
additional weight to Blomley’s (1994) assertion that the law is neither well-ordered nor
rational. Law, instead, is messy and complex with a logic all its own. The difficulty and
complexity of encounters with the law could be exacerbated (how greater gap or barriers
or distance) by a difference in language and socio-economic status.
Just as critical legal geographers have maintained that there is an irreducible union of
the social and the legal (the socio-legal) (see for example White, 2002) and of the spatial
and the legal (see for example Blomley, et al. 2001; Holder and Harrison, 2003), so too,
are language and the legal bound, forming a kind of language space as argued throughout
this paper. The legal matrix is formed by the social, the spatial, and the discursive; thus,
“[t]he legal and the spatial, the discursive and the material are inextricable” (Delaney,
2003: 71). Both language and the law are contact zones, spaces of social and legal
encounter. Thinking about outsiders to the law and the ‘Other’ more generally in terms
of language and language minorities sheds light on legal scholarship and the law in action
and conceptualizations of the ‘Other’. The consideration of proximity and distance in
terms of language and legal encounter/belonging corroborates with Georg Simmel’s
insight that the stranger’s proximity is “near and far at the same time” (Simmel, 1950: 3).
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When in the language minority and a legal subject, the stranger is near in that he is
physically present and far in that his language- though present in utterance in sound- is
absent in meaning. If spatial relations are the only the condition and the symbol of
human relations as Simmel (1950: 1) also contends, then the spatial relations inherent to
the imperfect compromise of language interpretation are no exception.
The above interview segment says much about the possible spatial difficulties,
including gaps, barriers, and distance, encountered by the language minority in the legal
system, as a “foreign animal” (R1, 10/08/08). Seen in this way, the law can be imagined
as a city grid, and language is the tool by which legal subjects “navigate” that grid.18
However, in the case of the U.S. legal system, those with low English proficiency are
attempting to navigate a foreign city without a map; they are “lost” (R1, 10/08/08). This
is not the cosmopolitan wayfaring often celebrated in mobilities research; but, instead,
this kind of “lost” could have legal, life-altering or life-threatening consequences.
Instead, the “lost” language minority/legal subject could find him or herself confused,
and almost spatially disoriented, in the midst of misinterpretation, misunderstanding,
miscommunication.

This disorientation is multi-fold because, not only is U.S. law

written and practiced in English, but it is a very specific, technical, and historical
legalese, which has been theorized as a language of its own requiring expertise in
knowledge and professional guidance. Thus, the legal language and the use of official
English acts as “a sort of passport that opens and closes doors, and its power is always
differential” (Rosello, 2001: 105). This statement applies, not only to the global scale
and international border-crossing (and Rosello’s French case study), but it also holds
weight at the local scale of Lexington, Kentucky, as emphasized here.
The interview passage above also illustrates the intersectionality of language barriers
with economic concerns and, possibly, citizenship status. For those whose legal
encounter is a legal predicament, it can be their lack of language skills that have gotten
them there in the first place, and this aural profiling- the language equivalent of visual
profiling, I suggest- can continue throughout their time in legal space.19 For those
attempting to enter into the legal space through immigration procedures, navigating the
18

This in vivo code that comes out across my interviews (R1, R3, R5, R6, R7), points to the
spatial imaginary that legal professionals have about law, implied if not explicitly expressed.
19
This is discussed further in the following chapter.
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law and its language is no less foreign or alien. Lack of language proficiency also
intersects with income status; for those that cannot afford to hire a lawyer or an
interpreter, navigation proves even more difficult. As the first interviewee (R1, 10/08/08)
concludes the question regarding possibility difficulties faced by the language minority
from his own experience as an attorney working with this clientele:
Yeah, you come back to the two basics. Basic number one is having the money to
be able to hire a good attorney, and, by the way, you don’t just hire an attorney
when you’re in trouble, you hire an attorney before you get in trouble in order to
avoid getting in trouble, and a good example would be real estate. If you’re not
familiar with various aspects of real estate law, then you really need an attorney.
A lot of people don’t really understand that. So, that’s true. And that’s one. And
the other is knowing the language. Same thing, yeah. It’s not just criminal
defense or immigration, it’s everything… The Law expects that you’re going to
behave in accordance with the Law. (my emphasis).
Even if law is a resource or a tool, it is not available without a cost (see S. Sibley, 2001).
The services provided by Maxwell Street Legal Clinic recognize the intersection of lowEnglish proficiency, income-status, and citizenship-status, and this non-profit legal clinic
has been established to address those very needs.
Later in the interview, the same respondent returns to explanations of how access to
the law differs for those in different economic situations, this time when I was probing
about the possibility ‘justice’ and “fairer treatment before the law”. He uses the example
of the first O.J. Simpson trial, and although this is an extreme example, it is, nonetheless,
provocative:
Well, compare OJ Simpson, who had a lot of money and the best of legal teams,
right? And, he got of[f].. he got.. at least he got a very fair hearing, whether you
agree with the outcome or not is…doesn’t matter, but he had the money to pay a
top-notch legal team… Compare that with somebody who is not an immigrant,
and who speaks English, but doesn’t have any money, and he’s a US
citizen…He’s in a completely different situation. So, it’s not just the immigrants
and those that don’t speak English, it’s just those that have more money can
afford better representation than those that don’t have as much, just the way that
they buy bigger and better houses, and have better vacations, and the rest of it.
When navigating or attempting to navigate the legal terrain, it seems as if a lack of
language skills and low-income status can be a point of vulnerability, and subjects
finding themselves adrift have been misled. A clear example of this is the situation in
Lexington and elsewhere involving notarios, that is, unqualified persons offering legal
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services.20 As one respondent (R1, 10/08/08) put it (see APPENDIX D for a longer excerpt
from the interview transcript):
…[T]here are people…who will offer themselves, both Spanish-speaking and
English-speaking people, who will offer immigration services without being
qualified to provide those services. They end up taking peoples’ money and
really sc… messing up their situation in a lot of cases by either filing forms that
they shouldn’t be filing because people are not eligible and they don’t know what
they’re doing, and what they really want to do is collect the money.
According to this respondent, in Latin America a ‘notary’ is frequently an attorney,
though that is not the case in the United States. Regardless of this, ‘notarios’ create
business and offer legal services they are not qualified to provide. This is problematic
not just because of the monetary burden on low-income people, but also because the misfiling of paperwork in Immigration Law can lead to delays in or denials of legal positions
at the time of filing or upon subsequent filings later on in the immigration process. In
Immigration Law, this is of particular concern because in this area of law “the rules are
very specific and very separate, and, if you don’t follow them, there’s not a lot of leeway
for mistakes” (R7, 12/17/08).
Because of the importance given to language in law, the mis-interpretation of a single
word (whether spoken by an interpreter or as interpreted heuristically by a judge or other
legal entity) can completely change someone’s life. As one court interpreter interview
for this study admitted, there are “irreconcilable cultural differences” (R2, 10/13/08)
involved in interpretation/ translation, and these differences can serve as yet another
barrier to navigation in legal encounter.

The cultural space of language and law

discussed above is further evidenced by the cultural implications and context of words
and word-use. Certain words needing qualification, and this, in turn, can have the effect
of greater distance in remove for the language minority/ legal subject.
The nuances between source and target language and the cultural understanding
couched in those nuances emerged in two other interviews in this research study, both
regarding transmission from Spanish to English. The next example is the adjective
‘secondaria/o’ (R2, date). In some Spanish-speaking countries, this word can mean
20

That the notarios are completely unqualified to help with legal matters is, of course, a positioned
perspective of a legal professional. This research neither attempts to interview notarios or subjects
utilizing their services, which would be necessary for a fuller understanding of this situation.
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either ‘up to middle school’ or ‘up to 12th grade’. This is important because, as Clark
(2001: 111) suggests, “to the extent that language is both representative and a constituent
part of how people understand their lives, the hegemony of the language of law may deny
the legitimacy of their personal experience”. While the difference might seem slight,
what risks being lost in interpretation/translation is an accurate account of the life history
of the legal subject. Such “readings” and the drawing of a less-than-complete picture of a
legal subject could, for one, have numerous legal implications and repercussions (cf.
Coutin, 2002).
Another word needing qualification is ‘el aborto’ (R5, 11/11/08). While the direct
translation is ‘abortion’, el aborto means both ‘a medical abortion’ and ‘a biological
miscarriage’. To demonstrate the significance of el aborto and how a legal outcome can
hinge on the proper interpretation of one word, the respondent (R5, 11/11/08) relayed a
situation she witnessed with a legal subject for whom she was advocating in a legal
setting. When asked how many children she had, the woman (in Spanish) responded that
she had

X

number of children and one abortion. The interpreter, rather than probing

further or contextualizing the Spanish noun, interpreted directly that she had had an
abortion:
[I]magine if that question [about abortion] had been asked in front of a very
conservative judge… There’s no spirit to that [in the spirit of the word]. Cause
you don’t know what she meant, you just made a decision for her.
From a domestic violence and advocacy perspective, the consequences resulting from a
lack of qualification or an ill-informed interpretation/translation could be severe,
especially in the U.S. and Kentucky context where abortion is hotly contested and might
have particular connotations for certain judges. Here we see how language and law
intersect on the axis of gender, an example of how judicial interpretation goes beyond the
abstraction of theory and has real affects on real people and real lives.

Indeed,

interpretation of the law and language as depends as much on the listener and the sociocultural context as it does the speaker and the interpreter, and there is an inescapable
politics of interpretation/translation (cf. Delaney, 1993). As membership and belonging
is linked to recognition (Benhabib, 2004), so is access intimately bound to understanding
in every sense of the word.
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LANGUAGE SPACE:
INTERPRETATION, MEDIATION, LEGAL-SUBJECT FORMATION

“For judges, attorneys, defendants, litigants, and witnesses alike, the presence of a foreign
language interpreter transforms normal courtroom proceedings into bilingual events.”
-Susan Berk-Selingson, 2001: 1

Interpretation is iteration, that is, it is a repetition of something already said and also a
repeated performance (the act of speaking, or utterance). In this way, interpretation is
always mediated. The role of the court interpreter is so mediated, in fact, that a courtappointed and/or employed interpreter cannot even be approached outside of the
courtroom. If, for example (an example taken from my participant observation field
notes), a non-English speaking person asked an interpreter directions to the bathroom, the
interpreter could not answer the question directly, even if he or she could understand and
knew the answer. Instead, an interpreter might motion the non-English speaking person
to another court employee, such as a deputy of the court. The non-English speaking
person would then be instructed to ask the question again, this time addressing the third
party. If the third party does not understand the language but knows where the restrooms
are located, the interpreter acts as the mediator between the two parties, thus retaining
his/her professionalism and impartiality.
The mediation of interpretation creates distance and spatiality in the act of
interpretation, and this distance contributes to the irreconcilable shades of exclusion of
language minorities in judicial space, which includes but is not limited to the highly
performative courtroom setting.

The word ‘decalage’,21 which emerged from my

interviews in Lexington, emphasizes not only the spatial, but also the temporal gap, angle
of difference, or displacement that exists in the practice of spoken language
interpretation. An aeronautical term, it signifies “the difference in the angle of incidence
between any two distinct aerofoils on an aeroplane; e.g., the main plane and the tail; or
more usually between the chords of the upper and lower planes of a biplane” (OED).
Nonetheless, ‘decalage’ is also used to designate the spaces between the utterance of the
source language and the re-utterance into the target language. As one of the informants
21

“Fr. décalage displacement, f. décaler to displace” (OED).
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(R6, 11/17/08) for this study put it, “[interpretation is] like a relay race, where English is
just a step behind”.
It could be said that interpretation is translocution and suggests a degree of
translocation, moving across or changing space in the process of iteration and re-iteration.
Because speech is presence (see, for example Levinas, 2007), the space occupied by the
language minority during the practice and process of interpretation is interstitial, and, in
this case, to think of the language minority (the stranger, the foreigner) is not to think of
an object, but to think distance (see Levinas, 2007: 49).

In the relay race of

interpretation, the interpreter, too, plays an active role in the subject formation and the
spatiality of the legal subject/ linguistic minority, especially considering that identity is
constructed discursively and in relation to other identities as well as to the space itself.
Since language and identity and space are mutually constituted (see for example
Valentine, et al., 2008), the insertion of a language mediator and of aural space, disrupts
proximity and, therefore, belonging. The more people involved, and the less direct the
communication from one person to another, the more room there is for error and
misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and miscommunication. A language minority could
miss a court date by no fault of his/her own, for instance, if the court relays the
information properly but the interpreter/translator misspeaks or writes down the wrong
numbers.
Language interpretation in any context aims to be a “totally impartial” (R2, 10/13/08)
practice accomplished through “faithful” (R2, 10/13/08) interpretation. To some extent,
however, the faithful rendering of language is more akin to a leap of faith. Like judicial
interpretation language interpretation is not without human error and bias. In other
words, “You can’t take the person out of the interpreter” (R5; 11/11/08); and, even the
most “finely tuned violin” (R2, 10/13/08) could break a string. For the legal subject who
is in the language minority, the interpreter can possibly create “another area of problems”
(R1, 10/08/08), or pose further difficulties to accessing the law. Take, for example, an
interview respondent’s (R1, 10/08/08) assessment of the situation of interpreters in court:
And, of course, that’s a whole ‘nother area of problems, and has been in the past,
uh, because, if you have an interpreter, who is not qualified or is not doing his or
her job properly, you’re Defense, if it’s a Criminal case, for example, you may not
be able to, you as a the defendant may not be able to assist the attorney in the
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defense of your own case because you don’t know what is going on. So you may
hear a question and give an answer that is incorrect because the way you heard it,
from that interpreter, was incorrect. And that has happened, and that has resulted
in cases being overturned because of ineffective Defense.
Similar to attorneys and notarios (business people offering legal services, as mentioned
above), interpreters can provide services that they are not necessarily qualified to handle,
despite certification and ethical regulations.

An ineffectual interpreter can be life-

threatening or life-altering when a defendant is unable to properly and thoroughly assist
his/her attorney in the defense of his/her own case.
Whether with regard to social services, medical services or legal services, etc.,
language interpretation entails not just proficiency in- an intimacy with- the source and
target language (to the extent that not just words, but nuanced meaning, vital
qualifications, and cultural shadings can be conveyed), but also familiarity with technical
terms, procedures, and ideas. Even a well-trained and certified interpreter is not able to
assume each and every subject-position of an individual in the language minority, and
this can have consequences. For instance, as one respondent (R5, 11/11/08) posed, “How
can an interpreter that doesn’t know what domestic violence can look like contribute to
ensuring that this person doesn’t get what she needs?” The ideal legal interpreter not
only understands the shades of meaning in a word (and recognizing the necessity to
convey and contextualize those meanings), but is also familiar with the specific sub-field
of law (which might differ in different local contexts) and could be able to empathize
with the language minority’s positionality and needs.
In a legal setting- whether at the clerk’s window, in court proceeding, or in an
attorney’s office- the interpreter is prohibited from giving clarifying explanations. It is
not the function of the interpreter to interpret/translate legalese or legal meaning to the
language minority. As one interpreter-respondent explained, “Our role is not to explain,
our role is not to clarify. Our role is simply to put a non-English speaker or a limited
English speaker into the same role that an English speaker would be” (R6, 11/17/08). In
the U.S., the role of the courtroom interpreter is to put the non-English speaker at the
same “level” (R2, date; R6, 11/17/08) as the English speaker with the goal of rendering
the target language as it was originally said in the source language. This is achieved
through, for one, consistency in “the register of the language” (R6, 11/17/08), or the level
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of education that language reflects. So, if a clerk, or a litigant, or judge, or a witness
speaks in legal or other jargon, what they say is interpreted as jargon. Conversely, if the
speaker is colloquial, uses slang or idiom, or curses,22 the English interpretation attempts
to mirror that register.
It is explicitly in the hands of the attorney to explain the rule and word of law to his
or her client, and herein lies another ‘problem’ in regard to language interpretation in
legal space, and this is a complication even for “cause lawyers” (see Sarat and
Scheingold, 2006). Although bilingual attorneys (especially those with social change
agendas) can prove indispensable guides who do open doors for their clients and offer a
change for more meaningful access to the law, simultaneously interpreting the law,
legalese, the action of legal proceedings, and the English language is like trying to juggle
a few too many things at once. Bilingualism on the part of an attorney can result in the
bridging of gaps for a language minority client external to the courthouse or in instances
not requiring a courthouse encounter (for example, the navigation of Immigration Law at
MSLC and the filing paperwork). However, explaining the law during proceedings is
difficult and outside of accepted practice, especially in an adversarial system like the U.S.
legal system, where an attorney speaks on behalf of his or her client and is in constant
conversation with the rest of the courtroom work group. For these reasons, if the legal
subject is a language minority, the individual might receive a “fairer” (from interview
with R1, 10/08/08) hearing before the law if he or she can afford to hire a personal
interpreter. To have more meaningful and more equal treatment before the law (as
compared to the native English-speaker), or equal treatment at all for that matter, the lowproficiency or non-English speaker- the language minority in the U.S.- must carry the
burden of an additional expense. And, with this, we again see the intersectionality of
questions of language and the economic status of legal subjects.
Despite misconceptions, the court interpreter does not interpret for the legal subject
alone, either; in fact, more than anyone in the courtroom, the interpreter is working for
the judge, who presides over the court of law. In this way, court interpretation provides
the Court access to the legal subject speaking a language not its own, rather than the
22

One of the only occasions when a court employee can openly swear in a courtroom is when an
interpreter is mirroring the register of the language.
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inverse. Yet, as Berk-Selingson’s (2001: 1) research finds, “the presence of a foreign
language interpreter transforms…courtroom proceedings”. Both my own observations
and the observations of my research respondents attest that there is a spatiality (aural,
visual, and socio-spatial) to this kind of bilingual language event, and the subject-forming
position the language interpreter plays in the courtroom affects how the foreigner
“figures” (see Honig, 2001) into that legal space. In some respects, the interpreter stands
between the law and the language minority, even if that interpreter, impartial, is confined
to the corner of a room. One usually looks in the direction of the speaking party, and so
the attendance of the interpreter alone signals difference, as do the soundscapes, and this
is not to mention predominately visual signifiers of difference including race, class (for,
example clothing and demeanor as discussed earlier by McCall, 1978), and gender.
Moreover, there are necessary pauses in speech that must occur for interpretation to be
rendered in a courtroom setting. When coupled with the decalage, these gaps or distances
in speech shape and influence not just the transmission of language, but also, perhaps
more significantly, the reception.

*

*

*

To what extent do laws, language, and space reinforce a subordinate social status?
Considerations of interpretation in a legal setting, I contend, allow us to penetrate into
this very question and to work towards a material and discursive understanding of the
law, perhaps the most insufficiently materialized of the discursive and material aspects of
the social (Delaney, 2003: 71). In the above analysis, I have examined how law is a set
of discourses and practices, and I have looked at some of the ways in which legal space is
both a language space and a material space. One practice occurring within law and legal
space is interpretation. As (re)iteration in a legal context, interpretation occurs in many
modalities and involves the transference and conveyance of meaning.
While recognizing overlaps in scales of interpretation, I focused on language
interpretation, and I sought to open up language as a site and an entrance-point into an
exploration of accessibility and law. I found language interpretation in a legal space
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entails language transmission as well as place-based understandings of law’s logic,
history, and culture. Even though law’s web is everywhere and access into courthouses
spaces are not barred, meaningful engagement in and with legal language space in the
United States requires the English language, legal language, and cultural knowledge.
From my research, I have found that the complexity of language interpretation and law
can be best understood in terms of spatiality. Barriers, gaps, distance- including cultural
difference, and mediation are all implicated in the translocution from a source to a target
language, both inside and outside the context of the courthouse. The effects of these
spatialities can risk legal consequences, which may be life-altering or threatening.
Thinking of the low English-proficiency legal subject in the U.S. in terms of the
“language minority” (Berk-Selingson, 2001), perhaps, stresses the possible exclusion
experienced by an LLP individual lost in the penumbras23 of law while drawing attention
to the importance of language in legal-subject formation.
If the marking of bodies as different can be associated with visual difference and
places as well as with language, which is not separate from place and “national origin”
(“Title VI Statute”) and linked to race, ethnicity, and, possibly, citizenship status, then
spatial differentiation may also be tied to perceptions of similarity and difference. In the
next chapter, I address some local legal strategies and tactics in the greater-Lexington’s
legal apparatus, in light of perceptions and practices in the changing metropolitan area,
particularly as they relate to the language minority.

23

Another aspect of judicial interpretation not mentioned above is the spirit of the law, or
‘penumbra’. ‘Penumbra’ in the context of U.S. law, especially in constitutional jurisprudence,
refers to “the scope of a legal provision, esp. the range of its application extending beyond the
rights, privileges, or immunities it enumerates explicitly” (OED). For example, the ‘right to
privacy’ upon which ROE V. WADE was ultimately decided was found in the penumbras of the
Third Amendment (part of the Bill of Rights), which pertains to the right not to quarter soldiers in
one’s home during peace-time. Although there is no mention to privacy in the Amendment, the
interpretation found that the spirit of one’s ‘own house’ signals the right to privacy. Another
meaning of ‘penumbra’ is “a faint intimation of something undesirable; a peripheral region of
uncertain extent; a group of things only partially belonging to some central thing” (OED). Is it
possible to think of the language minority, distanced and perhaps even lost, to be occupying this
shaded, peripheral region of nebulous discursive legal space?
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V. BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND RECEPTION:
THE ‘OTHER’ AS LANGUAGE MINORITY
IN LEXINGTON’S LEGAL SPACE
“…[T]he issue of language cannot be dissociated from the most basic level of hospitality,
and one who rejects the other’s language is already rejecting him or her.”
- Mireille Rosello, 2001: 105

If notions of proximity and distance signal “feelings about difference” (D. Sibley,
1995), then, in what ways do these feelings serve as a foundation for exclusion, rather
than inclusion? This is of particular significance when we consider that the meaning
attached to difference and status is central to understanding the immigrant experience
(Calavita, 2005: 164; see also Honig, 2001), and that this is enforced, even if by symbolic
force (Derrida 1992: 6), both inside and outside legal settings. How do language factors
and barriers contribute, not only to the creation of space between people in place as
discussed in the previous chapter, but, by extension, to everyday exclusionary practices
and regulations (D. Sibley, 1995), especially considering that law is a set of discourses
and institutions with its own geography? If social belonging and socio-legal belonging
are related to reception and recognition, then what are the implications of the “figure” of
the language minority in meaningful legal inclusiveness or equal access, as part of the
publicity, before the law, and in Lexington, KY? These are some of the questions that
provoke the analysis that follows.
Because of the inseparability of the legal apparatus, interpretation outside of the
courthouse is just as vital to the fulfillment of meaningful access as is interpretation
inside of this space, and in both orientations (outside or inside) there are tensions between
what kinds of access should be provided versus the access that is, in fact, provided. In
this chapter, I further expand upon language proficiency and language interpretation in
legal spaces, recognizing that perceptions influence practices. Enforcement, which is
about upholding rights and punishing ‘wrongs’, is often marked by de facto and not just
de jure local protocols and local enforcement policies. These local practices may be
further complicated by biases and presumptions on the part of service providers. Because
ideology play an important role in the way law is carried out (Wani, 1989-90), recent
improvements in availability and access to interpretation in Lexington do not nullify the
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need for legal advocacy and activism on the part of and on behalf of the language
minority.

Maxwell Street Legal Clinic (MSLC), I find, plays an important role in

Lexington’s local legal universe in this regard. Founded in response to local legal needs,
this institution within the legal institution serves as another site of language encounter,
and it fosters the implementation of hospitable strategies and tactics in the face and
within earshot of local legal barriers.

Y E T ”: L A N G U A G E A C Q U I S I T I O N
I N L EX I N G T O N ’ S L E G A L A P P A R A T U S

“N O T

&

INTERPRETATION SERVICES

“…Migrants are often defined as ‘out of place’ (cf. Cresswell, 1996) in their new environment
despite being multi-lingual because their particular individual linguistic competencies do not
always fit the norms or expectations of the particular spaces which they inhabit and so their
identities are inscribed by others as not belonging.”
Gil Valentine, et al., 2008: 377

In Lexington, language barriers in legal settings have persisted despite the LLPrelated Executive Order and the “LLP Guidance”, in part due to the time for education,
training, etc. needed to implement these guidelines and to adapt to the changing voices in
and of the city. Time and timing play a part in both the transmission of language
(decalage and pauses), but also in the availability of and access to meaningful, effective
language interpretation services in a legal context. In Lexington and perhaps in other
cities in the “New South”, the growth of the immigrant community has been rapid and
recent enough (R7, 12/17/08) that many attorneys and other legal service providers in the
area have not yet gained the proper experience of working with non-native English
speakers in legal settings. This can be thought of as the language equivalent of Y2K, and
the Lexington legal community needs to “catch up” (R7, 12/127/08) to the changing
needs of the community and to gain experience through working with new, non-Englishspeaking, kinds of clients.
Similarly, from the language minority perspective, language acquisition itself takes
time, and it is not as simple as ‘just learning English’, which is not to deny the agency of
the non-English speaker. As one informant (R5, 11/11/08) in this study reports:
It takes about 150 hours of instruction to be able to be considered a beginning
language learner, to be able to survive in another language, 500 hours to become
an intermediate language learner, be able to navigate, I guess, 1500 hours to
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become ‘fluent’. The average American- 40 hours a week, 52 weeks a yearworks 2080 hours a year. That means it takes 9 months of 40 hours a week, week
in, week out instruction of another language to get to be at a fluent point where
you can interact effectively with someone else.
That she had these facts memorized from an article she had read made obvious that, as an
immigrant advocate, she often makes this line of argumentation on behalf of the
population she is serving. She also admitted she can relate personally to the difficulties of
language acquisition among other barriers to institutional access. Like law, English is
everywhere, but that does not necessarily mean that access to the English language, or
law for that matter, is easy or without time, knowledge, instruction, or guidance.
Furthermore, there is, in terms of access and understanding, a qualitative difference or
distance between meaningful and non-meaningful access related to the degree of
effective communication and interaction:
…So, I don’t know who has the luxury to be able to do that. So, that doesn’t
really make a whole lot of sense to say, ‘Oh, well go learn English’. That’s just
unreasonable to expect that. What happens is that people live; people find jobs
where they’re the only person who doesn’t speak English. It’s impossible to
escape the English language, so, at every point, you are learning it; it’s just not in
that consecutive, focused way. It’s more like situation, you know? So people are
kind of learning it as they go, but it’s not enough to navigate the systems that they
need, like the EPO process, or calling the police, or going to court. (R5, 11/11/08)
This language space is significant when there are misunderstandings or further “gaps”
between interlocutors as detailed in the previous chapter. But, language is also of
concern when official or formal conversations cannot take place at all, either because of
the difference/distance itself or due to presumptions about how to overcome this distance.
Ignorance on behalf of legal service providers and enforcers with concern to
understanding the process and duration of language acquisition could further delay the
possibility for meaningful access and encounter.
Additionally, the (pejorative) recognition of a language minority as different in a legal
setting can and has become proxy or code for ethnicity, race, and citizenship-status.
Incidentally, this advocate-respondent also conveyed that there have been reported
instances where judges have suggested that a legal-subject learn English before trying to
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make her case before the court.24 In Lexington, attorneys, too, have been concerned that
judges would ask about the citizenship status when they entered the court and went
before the law as a language minority (R3, 10/17/08). Judges do not always act within
the legal boundaries, and these occurrences and concerns persist despite prohibitions
against asking about citizenship status when it is not legally admissible25 and provisions
for language services to counter discrimination practices. As one respondent suggests,
“It’s easier to say you don’t speak English, than to say you’re an immigrant or you’re not
white” (R5, 11/11/08). Although the 2001 additions to Title VI acknowledge that
language discrimination is linked to discrimination based on national origin, language as
a site of discrimination is perhaps less politically suspect than racial discrimination,
especially when considering the national history and historical memory that led up to the
establishment of the Civil Rights Act. Even if it were feasible to claim ‘colorblindness’,
‘languagedeafness’, or some such claim, seems, to me, less likely.
Because courtroom protocols and legal judgment are governed in part by judges, who
are not without human error or bias, a legal strategy like ‘court watch’ could prove
effective for monitoring courtroom practices and outcomes. Still, “[t]here are actually
lots of things involving language and the courts, though language access inside the courts
is actually better” (R5, 11/11/08). Outside of the courthouse setting, but within the
legal/juridical context, language and language interpretation figure into other types of
legal navigation and encounter, including interactions with police officers, lawyers, legal
clerks, or even, notarios.26

Aural profiling-listening for and targeting non-English

spoken language, especially Spanish, as different and as a signifier of undocumented
legal status- is an issue, not only with some Lexington judges (as reported by R3,
10/17/08), but also with other facets of the legal apparatus, most notably, the police (R5,

24

While I cannot validate her account here, I know this type of behavior on the part of judges is
not unrealistic. In 2004-05, in another “New South” state, Tennessee, Wilson County Judge
Barry Tatum ordered two mothers, both originally from Mexico, to learn English or risk loss of
parental rights (Barry, 2005).
25
There are also viable legal loopholes to ‘illegal’ status, in the case of the Violence Against
Women’s Act (VAWA).
26
Outside of the legal context, in the U.S., non-English speakers might also deal with daily
language barriers due to the prominence of written and spoken language in the social fabric.

73

11/11/08).27 In the case of aural profiling and in certain legal settings, language itself is
almost criminalized for being ‘Other’; and this revelation begins to get at some of the
relationships between language, immigration, and criminality. Thus, “identity checks”
appear to precede the “granting” of meaningful inclusion (Rosello, 2001: 37) regardless
of recognition, and this, in turn, affects meaningful legal access and engagement. This
suggests that, in the Lexington legal context, criminalizing an individual in the language
minority is easier when gaps in understanding legalese and legal culture are compounded
by limited mastery English, the national and legal language.

This also further

complicates the legal subject- as- language minority position, as it suggests an experience
interlaced with fear.
There is a geography and a spatiality to language interpretation, and those requiring
these services occupy in the entire legal apparatus so that “[f]orward, we have this issue
of immigration and backward we have the court clerk’s office, or clerks, who may not be
providing access to the actual courtroom, but then behind that we still have the police.”
(R5, 11/11/08).

Considerations of the multiple levels and layers of law and its

intersection with language and access prove crucial here, as do understandings of the
complex geographies of everyday life. Although the situation with language minorities
inside the courthouse has improved to a certain extent, language services throughout the
legal process, especially those not federally or locally mandated, have not necessarily
changed.

This is additionally exacerbated by possible anti-immigrant and anti-

immigration sentiments, which several respondents report have actually gotten worse
within the past few years (R3, 10/17/08; R5, 11/11/08; R7, 12/17/08). If legal actions can
result in life-altering or life-threatening outcomes, and, if effectual communication is
linked to more meaningful legal access, then we might wonder: What are the social
27

Beyond the scope of this paper and research project- but also an important piece of the larger
puzzle- there are more contradictions within the law and overlaps between law and language with
regard to undocumented immigrants, aural profiling, and legal entanglement. This is related to
local enforcement practices and the enforcement of Immigration Law, which is federal, on the
local and state levels as well as legal practices within the prison system. It is possible that
someone who does not look or sound like he or she ‘belongs’ could be charged with a petty crime
or traffic violation, which could deliver him or her into the hands of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), perhaps leading to deportation (as per interviews with R5, 11/11/08 and R3
10/17/08).
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implications when the necessary survival skills are a luxury items?
While Title VI now says agencies that receive federal funding will provide
meaningful access to their services, “…that’s not a reality quite yet” (R5, 11/11/08). As
feminist legal scholarship has emphasized, law is contradictory in that its purpose is
twofold; on one hand the law protects, and on the other it enforces. Yet, when we think
about language access as a civil right, law becomes even messier and complex, because a
kind of enforcement, or upholding of the laws, is also essential to law-as-protector (of
rights). That is, the rights are also legal doctrine. The upholding of the Title VI
provisions, for example, is dependent upon local law makers and keepers, and on those
advocates and attorneys who press upon law and its practitioners toward more socially
equitable agendas. As stated by one informant, “there has to be someone [in the position
of power to do so] willing to enforce… to act on it [the laws]” (R5, 11/11/08), and this
includes Civil Rights Laws. She continues:
…if people aren’t a) understanding, b) choosing to enforce or act upon what’s
available to them, then it doesn’t matter how many by-laws we have, it doesn’t
matter how many Title VI’s we have, it doesn’t matter how many Civil Rights
Acts we have. If the people are able to make those choices to enforce, then it
doesn’t really matter.
By “people”, here, she is referring to practitioners and maintainers of law and legal
‘order’.

This interview segment arises out of a larger discussion about language

interpretation and the legal apparatus, issues of financing the use of language lines and
interpreters, and local legal practices and prejudices. This interviewee often returns to
the topic of police and the prison industrial complex, which is understandable considering
her advocate positionality and the fears and concerns of her clientele, with whom she
apparently empathizes. That interpretation factors into law beyond traditionally thought
of legal spaces, such as the courthouse, to the entire legal apparatus -as- legal space,
including police jurisdictions, seems crucial to the problematic of interpretation and
language barriers in Lexington, similar connections were also made by other respondents
in this research (R3, 10/17/08).
Although these interviewees express reservations about law-as-regulator and punisher
throughout their interviews, they want, and even expect, that rights-based laws will be
enforced in every facet of legal space. Due to the inherent paradox of law, however,
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sometimes the law that seeks to protect the publicity is itself a perpetrator of ‘abuses’ on
that very publicity, and it often under-enforcement- in the case of Title VI- that acts as a
barrier to meaningful inclusion. When probed why she thought language services were
not always provided in legal spaces, the interviewee quoted above answered, “I think […]
it’s a tendency… to see these services as extra, as special, special rights, kind of
ideology” (R5, 11/11/08).

Yet, as my research has begun to show, language

interpretation services in legal spaces are neither superficial nor inconsequential. In fact,
as of 2001, Title VI federally mandates that all institutions receiving federal funding take
measures to provide meaningful access for individuals in the language minority.
Language is not peripheral, but central, to the practice and formation of law in any legal
or juridical setting, and this is particularly so because law and the social milieu are
always changing and are mutually constitutive.

Still, de facto legal practices in

Lexington exist despite de jure regulations, even though federal laws always trump state
and local laws in the hierarchy of legal scale.
“Seeing” language services as “extra” and “special” is linked to the real and
perceived financial costs of providing these services, and this is of concern in an
economically-strapped city like Lexington.28 The un-availability of language services, or
the denial of rights to individuals in the language minority, may also be connected to
ignorance, personal biases and prejudices, and anti-immigrant/immigration feelings on
the end of legal enforcers and practitioners. These “feelings of difference” are related to
the spatiality inherent to interpretation and language difference and to the interrelationship between alterity and distance.

The possibility of meaningful access in

Lexington, then, might involve changes in local perceptions and values, which could also
take time. When asked how she could see this change of minds happening, the above
respondent (R5, 11/11/08) continues, as if speaking directly to these enforcers and
practitioners:
…[By] deciding that language accessibility is going to be a good thing for your
entire community. Your ruling in court may not be as much in question if you do
have good language accessibility…. Making it a priority or policy for your
agency, just making it…stop thinking of it as something extra. You need lights to
28

Lexington’s financial problems are evidenced in my research by the budget cuts made to the
Public Defender’s Office, for example.
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operate, to do your job. You need pencils to do your job. You need an interpreter
to do your job with someone who doesn’t speak English. That’s just the way it is.
Aside from being part of the “job” of practicing and upholding law and the “cost of doing
business” (R5, 11/11/08), provisions for language interpretation services are a necessary
element of legal adaptation corresponding to the proliferation of new types of journeys
(Rosello, 2001) and migration flows. Changes of this kind could benefit, not just to
individuals in the language minority, but the entire community of Lexington and the
potential for democratic practices therein, especially if the Lexington ‘public’, and all
‘publics’, are formed because of and not in spite of difference (see Young, 1990; Honig,
2001).

Investment in language interpretation services, then, goes beyond even “an

investment in diversity” (R5. 11/11/08), as offered up by this interviewee.
Within a U.S. legal space, those with limited English proficiency are affected at the
both “symbolic and practical level” (Rosello, 2001: 40), and the way those in the
language minority are ‘viewed’ can affect their treatment amidst local legal practices, and
this, ultimately, limits access.

Due to the centrality of language and language

interpretation to law, however, the possibility of meaningful access before and within law
requires meaningful engagement.

This calls for the prioritization of language

interpretation services in the legal spaces of a changing city. With this in mind, I now
look briefly at the ways Maxwell Street Legal Clinic (MSLC) acts as legal meeting place
for immigrants, often also in the language minority, in Lexington, Kentucky.

MAXWELL STREET LEGAL CLINIC: IN THE NAME OF HOSPITALITY?

“[G]eographers have contributed to moral and ethical theory, by calling attention to
the spatial implications of our moral and ethical commitments.”
-Jeff Popke, 2003: 300

Maxwell Street Legal Clinic, a not-for-profit legal firm, is one facet of a local legal
network comprised of immigrant advocates, legal lobbyists (The Kentucky Equal Justice
Center), and cause-oriented attorneys (paid and pro bono), and other volunteers interested
in immigration issues and legal equity for immigrants in Kentucky.

Local legal

networking and resource-sharing are a major legal strategy in Lexington, which has
grown in response to the growing needs of the community, both within the city and in the
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greater Central and Eastern Kentucky region. These local needs, as discussed above, are
a reflection of the recent and rapid increase in immigration to the Lexington area, which
has been concentrated in the past five years (R7, 12/17/08). But, even in 1999, when the
clinic had its start “Immigration [Law] was in great demand, immigration services were
in great demand” (R1, 10/08/08).
MSLC, now in its tenth year of operation, serves underrepresented groups,
particularly low-income clients in Kentucky requiring family-based immigration-related
services, including immigration processing, refugee and asylum cases, and, in some
cases, wage claims. In offering these services at little cost, the clinic and its staff and
volunteers help fill several gaps in the Kentucky legal apparatus. Without the MSLC,
these gaps might otherwise go unfilled; outside of Louisville, Kentucky, it is the only
non-profit legal clinic serving immigrant populations in the entire state. When asked to
describe the clinic’s clientele, one of my interviewees (R1, 10/08/08) responded:
…It’s the immigrant that comes in and has no place else to go… There are pro
bono legal services that are available to people if they are local [LEGAL]
permanent residents or U.S. citizens, but some of these folks are not, so they have
no place else to go, and some of them don’t speak the language, so we can
sometimes help them here…
MSLC was came about as the result of a brainstorming session with members of the
Catholic Charities of Louisville at a local church, and is made possible due to in-kind
donations from the Maxwell Street Presbyterian Church on whose property it sits (R1,
10/08/08). In this interview segment, there is a sense of the moral or ethical premises
serving as the clinic’s foundation. It is as if the clinic makes space within the legal space
for those for whom there is ‘no room in the inn’. In a local legal universe replete with
gaps and barriers and anti-immigrant presumptions, MSLC is a place of hospitality in
Lexington. As a place of ‘hospitality’, MSLC focuses on the negotiations that take place
in the contested legal spaces where people ‘meet’ and attempts to provide legal services
that recognize and are receptive to immigrant and language minority needs. Rather than
monetary gain, the attorneys, advocates, and volunteers associated with MSLC are driven
by a kind of ethics of possibility and a sense of what meaningful access to law ought be.
MSLC is able to address needs based on the experience of working with a specific
community and a very specific area of law, Immigration Law. Because the majority of
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its staff and volunteers are bilingual in English and Spanish, they are able to assist in
bridging some of the distances between the language minority client and law. When the
primary language of the legal subject or would-be legal subject is one other than English
or Spanish, MSLC turns to its volunteer pool for interpreters and translators, and, in some
instances, they utilize language lines and paid interpretation. Moreover, because MSCL
is a non-profit organization and does not receive federal funding, its attorneys are able to
work with and represent undocumented persons, who might have nowhere else to go for
legal assistance. The fact that the clinic avoids accepting federally allocated monies in
order to serve these kinds of clients (R3, 10/17/08) attests to the progressive and
hospitable mission of this legal clinic.
The clinic plays an important role in the Central and Eastern Kentucky region as a
touchstone for low-income clients and clients in the language minority seeking legal
services. MSLC fosters a spirit of openness in both its principles and practices, and holds
weekly open-intake hours. When asked if he thought the clinic was a place where
immigrants and those in the language minority might come to first before searching for
other legal help, an interviewee (R1, 10/08/08) replied:
A lot of them do come here first. We never advertise, don’t have to advertise…
They have found us from day one. Uh, so, when I say we refer people out, I mean
if there’s a clear case where we can’t handle it, obviously that person needs to be
referred, so… But, if they’re Immigration matters, and a person doesn’t have
much money, we try our best to provide the services they need.
Especially if anti-immigrant sentiments exist in Lexington, even in the legal community,
as several respondents in this research relayed29 (R3, 10/17/08; R5, 11/11/08; R7
11/17/08), MSLC might stand for some clients lost in legal space as both a safe space and
a place they know they can go and talk to people in Spanish or in other languages about
legal matters. And this is not limited to Immigration matters. In approximately ten years,
the clinic has seen about 3,500 clients and has dealt with about 5,000 matters. However,
as they are overwhelmed with the number of cases they already have, MSLC will referout as many people as they can to other attorneys or agencies; in this way, they also serve
as a community legal referral system.

29

This perception influences their advocacy work on behalf of immigrant legal subjects.
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Thanks to a grant from the Knight Foundation, MSLC is also able to coordinate and
host the “Citizenship Project” (R3, 10/17/08), thus assisting some of its clients inside and
outside of law. Acting as a site for education in U.S. history, which is imperative to
understanding U.S. law, as well as civil and legal rights, this project prepares its
participants for U.S. life and civic engagement before and after naturalization.
Additionally, MSLC provides some English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction.
Not only are ESL classes a key component of the LLP plan (“Poly Guidance”), but also
this and other forms of education may relieve to a degree future language barriers that
can preclude meaningful access in law and in other settings.
The mission of Maxwell Street Legal Clinic attends to issues of income disparities,
perceptions of the ‘Other’, and the problematic of language proficiency and law. With its
legal services, the clinic attempts to fill some of the gaps and bridge some of the
distances in Lexington’s legal space formed at the intersection of immigration, language,
and law. I suggest that there is an ethics of hospitality involved with the granting of these
services, understanding ‘hospitality’ as another kind of legal resistance that goes against
the norm of what are perceived as inhospitable practices or scenarios, such as the barriers
to engagement, inclusion, and meaningful legal access discussed in this chapter. In
Lexington, these barriers involve feelings of difference and distance, which might
include: ignorance, personal biases and prejudices, and anti-immigrant/immigration
sentiments on the end of legal enforcers and practitioners.
Fighting law with law (Robson, 1998) is one possible way to force meaningful access
in light of legal closure, and this tactic could entail court watch and other methods of
legal advocacy and policy work, including lobbying. Additionally, legal advocates and
activists can push for language appropriate services a matter of civil rights and not just
cultural competence (cf. Suleiman, 2003). Above all, making those in the language
minority in a U.S. legal context heard requires listening to these voices, which though
often missed, are not, in fact, “missing” (cf. Conley and O’Barr, 1990); and this, beyond
mere recognition, is a matter of reception. An ethics of hospitality on the part of cause
lawyers and advocates, then, is a response. Counter to legal closure, this legal response is
about the reception of immigrants and the welcoming of the possibility for meaningful
access to and before law for the legal subject in the language minority.
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VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

LANGUAGE AND SHADES OF BELONGING
“Law sits poised between the present reality of violence and
the promises of a justice not yet realized.
-Austin Sarat, 2001: 8

In this thesis, I maintain that legal space is formed at the intersection of law and
language, and I argue that an investigation into the practices of language interpretation is
foundational to an examination of law and legal access. Meaningful access to and
engagement with law, I find, involves English language proficiency as it intersects with
other social, cultural, and economic barriers. Focusing on language interpretation in
relation to law and access to both law and legal spaces, my research shows that there are
multiple interpretations and multiple interpretation spaces within law.

In terms of

language, limits to access to the law can be understood as spatial differentiation in legal
language space pertaining to the practice and process of interpretation, including gaps,
barriers, distance, and mediation. These differences/distances can impede meaningful
access to and within legal space.
In a U.S. legal context such as Lexington's legal universe, “language minority”, a
term adopted by Susan Berk-Selingson (2002), points to the spatial positioning of the
“Low Level Proficiency” (LLP) legal subject. In legal space, in particular, in a U.S.
context, the limited or non-English speaker is in the language minority amongst English
speaking enforcers and practitioners of law and the English-based text of the law itself.
Additionally, law has its own technical language, or legalese, and access to law involves
legal know-how and some understanding of law’s culture, history, and logic. Because of
this, law can be a “foreign animal”, even for the native English-speaker, and it is further
removed from those who do not speak English or speak limited English.
Meaningful access to legal language space, I find, requires the English language,
legal language, and cultural knowledge. “Fairer” access to the law requires, not just
knowledge, but also an ‘admission fee’; as, ideally, the legal subject -as- language
minority would hire a personal interpreter for contemporaneous court interpretation; that
is, to relay the court occurrences as they are taking place. The possibility of language81

based equity before and access to law is not without monetary cost for the language
minority, then, and navigating the legal system and the law might prove more difficult for
those with low or fixed incomes. As this thesis shows, both language skills and low
income status can be a point of vulnerability for individuals in the language minority
inside the legal system; to highlight this, I provided the example of notarios, or,
unqualified business people offering legal services. As language space, law can be
related to a city grid with language as the tool by which legal subjects “navigate” that
grid; those who do not yet know how or cannot afford to navigate that space with its
‘logic’ may find themselves lost in interpretation.
The problematic of interpretation involves both local needs and local resources.
Because law is specialized and professionalized, attorneys and legal practitioners act as
gatekeepers to legal understanding, and their guidance can help in a legal subject’s
possibility of gaining more familiarity with law's terrain.

For the legal system,

interpreters are also a resource, and there are disparities in access to interpretation and
interpretation quality amongst individuals in the language minority due to differences in
levels of certification and in the availability of interpreters.

In Lexington, if the

individual is Spanish-speaking, then the interpretation might be better than for a nonSpanish, non- English speaker. The more languages involved, the greater the degree of
error, miscommunication, misunderstanding, and loss of meaning…and the less
meaningful the legal access. The possibilities for meaningful access to law and legal
services, then, vary depending on the legal subject's primary language as a result of
“gaps” in interpretation. In addition to the availability of resources, disparities to
language access both inside and outside the courthouse in Lexington also involve local
perceptions and prejudices as well as the extent of enforcement and compliance of
measures meant to provide meaningful access for those in the language minority.
The existence of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the more recent
implementation of the 2001 Executive Order 13166, and the creation of the “LLP
Guidelines”, I suggest, recognize barriers to access to federally funded institutions,
including the judicial institution, and seek to overcome them in terms of leveling the
playing field for legal subjects.

This legislation, it seems, has contributed to

improvements in court interpretation services in Lexington (Fayette County) in
82

approximately the last five years. Changes in interpretation services are connected to
changes in immigration in the city and its surroundings, and they have to a certain extent
resulted in better accessibility, particularly for Spanish-speaking legal subjects. If laws
reflect the changing social conceptions on citizenship (cf. Mitchell, 2001), then the recent
addition to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act may demonstrate a possible evolution in the
perception regarding a growing language minority population within the U.S. borders,
and this might even foreshadow expected/projected changes in and adaptation to
migration patterns and future citizenship composition. This change might be seen as a
reflection of inclusion, rather than exclusion.
However, as my research and the above analysis has begun to reveal, we cannot be
too optimistic about language inclusion in terms of legal services and within legal spaces,
as there are as many obstacles as there are openings, including the spatio-lingual effects
of the practice of interpretation. Despite improvements in availability and access to
interpretation in Lexington and cause lawyers such as those at Maxwell Street Legal
Clinic, there are still many limitations related to language interpretation and law both in
the local legal apparatus and more broadly. While Title VI now mandates agencies
receiving federal funding to provide LLPs meaningful access to their services, this is not
quite a reality in Lexington yet. The spaces arising in the practice of interpretation are
spaces of encounter replete with their own set of politics and complications.
While the role of language in relation to identity has been under-theorized in
geography, considerations of language and language use are important to socio-spatial
relations in an era of intensifying globalization and cultural contact (Valentine, et al.,
2008). Language use is an implication of “new migration flows”, which has “profound
implications for identity and belonging” (ibid.: 376). For, as Cecelia Menjívar (2006:
999-1000) finds, the immigrants’ relationship to the juris corpus “governs their lives as it
impinges on…their existence...[and] shapes who they are , how they relate to others, their
participation in local communities, and their continued relationship with their
homelands”. But, the relationship between immigrant and law is also always governed
by and mediated through language, and sometimes through language interpretation; and,
so, the situation and its challenges may be exacerbated for those in the language minority.
It is necessary, then, to think about “legal liminality” (Menjívar, 2006) and “legal non83

existence” (Coutin, 2000) and the gray, shaded, in-between areas of social belonging and
membership, not just in terms of the effects of legal status on the lives of immigrants, but
also with regard to language as it interfaces with immigrant lives in the U.S., including
but not limited to legal status. Indeed, just as people can be physically present but not
‘officially’ admitted into the national community or symbolically accepted by the
doctrines of that community (cf. Wani, 1989-90) or can occupy a position simultaneously
inside and outside (Cresswell, 1996), so too can those in the language minority be
physically present in legal spaces without being fully received into that space and that
jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX A

MAXWELL STREET LEGAL CLINIC
Volunteer Contract
•

All volunteers are required to attend a volunteer orientation before beginning
specific volunteer positions.

•

Volunteers must provide at least twenty hours of service before they can list their
experience on a resume or receive a recommendation for services performed.

•

Volunteers must hold as absolutely confidential all information that may be
obtained directly or indirectly concerning clients and staff and not seek to obtain
confidential information from the client unless otherwise approved by MSLC
supervising staff and directly related to and required for the client’s case.

•

Volunteers must promote the mission, work and activities of MSLC in a positive
manner with all staff, clients, and the general public at all times.

•

Volunteers must contact the Volunteer Coordinator if unable to follow through
with their commitment.

•

Volunteers agree to have their pictures taken and used for promotional purposes
for Maxwell Street Legal Clinic.

•

Volunteers must not have in their possession illegal substances, firearms or open
alcohol during their volunteer time.

•

Worker’s Compensation is not provided for volunteers.

•

Volunteers are responsible for the safety of their own personal property. We
recommend that all valuables be left at home.

•

Volunteers must be punctual and conscientious, conduct themselves with dignity,
courtesy, and consideration of others.

___________________________________
Volunteer Signature

_____________

Date

___________________________________
_____________
Volunteer Coordinator Signature
Date
315 Lexington Avenue, Lexington, Kentucky 40508 (859) 233-3840 (voice & fax) www.maxlegalaid.kyequaljustice.org
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APPENDIX B
“Questions and Answers for the (Old) Naturalization Exam”
1. What are the colors of our flag?
Red, White, and Blue.
2. How many stars are there in our flag?
50
3. What color are the stars on our flag?
White.
4. What do the stars on the flag mean?
One for each state in the Union.
5. How many stripes are there in the flag?
13
6. What color are the stripes?
Red and White.
7. What do the stripes on the flag mean?
They represent the original 13 states.
8. How many states are there in the Union?
50
9. What is the 4th of July?
Independence Day.
10. What is the date of Independence Day?
July 4th
11. Independence from whom?
England
12. What country did we fight during the Revolutionary
War?
England
13. Who was the first President of the United States?
George Washington
14. Who is the President of the United States today?
Currently George W. Bush
15. Who is the vice-president of the United States today?
Currently Richard B. (“Dick”) Cheney
16. Who elects the President of the United States?
The electoral college
17. Who becomes President of the United States if the
President should die?
Vice - President
18. For how long do we elect the President?
Four years
19. What is the Constitution?
The supreme law of the land
20. Can the Constitution be changed?
Yes
21. What do we call a change to the Constitution?
An Amendment
22. How many changes or amendments are there to the
Constitution?
27
23. How many branches are there in our government?
3
24. What are the three branches of our government?
Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary
25. What is the legislative branch of our government?
Congress
26. Who makes the laws in the United States?
Congress
27. What is the Congress?
The Senate and the House of Representatives
28. What are the duties of Congress?
To make laws
29. Who elects the Congress?
The people
30. How many senators are there in Congress?
100

31. Can you name the two senators from your state?
(insert local information)
32. For how long do we elect each senator?
6 years
33. How many representatives are there in Congress?
435
34. For how long do we elect the representatives?
2 years
35. What is the executive branch of our government?
The President, vice president, cabinet, and departments under
the cabinet members
36. What is the judiciary branch of our government?
The Supreme Court
37. What are the duties of the Supreme Court?
To interpret laws
38. What is the supreme court law of the United States?
The Constitution
39. What is the Bill of Rights?
The first 10 amendments of the Constitution
40. What is the capital of your state?
(insert local information)
41. Who is the current governor of your state?
(insert local information)
42. Who becomes President of the United States if the
President and the vice-president should die?
Speaker of the House of Representative
43. Who is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court?
William Rehnquist (or whoever is next)
44. Can you name thirteen original states?
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Rhode Island, and Maryland.
45. Who said, “Give me liberty or give me death.”?
Patrick Henry
46. Which countries were our enemies during World War
II?
Germany, Italy, and Japan
47. What are the 49th and 50th states of the Union?
Alaska and Hawaii
48. How many terms can the President serve?
2
49. Who was Martin Luther King, Jr.?
A civil rights leader
50. Who is the head of your local government?
(insert local information)
51. According to the Constitution, a person must meet
certain requirements in order to be eligible to become
President. Name one of these requirements.
Must be a natural born citizen of the United States; must be at
least 35 years old by the time he/she will serve; must have lived
in the United States for at least 14 years.
52. Why are there 100 Senators in the Senate?
Two (2) from each state
53. Who selects the Supreme Court justice?
Appointed by the President
54. How many Supreme Court justice are there?
Nine (9)
55. Why did the Pilgrims come to America?
For religious freedom
56. What is the head executive of a state government called?
Governor
57. What is the head executive of a city government called?
Mayor
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58. What holiday was celebrated for the first time by the
Americans colonists?
Thanksgiving
59. Who was the main writer of the Declaration of
Independence?
Thomas Jefferson
60. When was the Declaration of Independence adopted?
July 4, 1776
61. What is the basic belief of the Declaration of
Independence?
That all men are created equal
62. What is the national anthem of the United States?
The Star-Spangled Banner
63. Who wrote the Star-Spangled Banner?
Francis Scott Key
64. Where does freedom of speech come from?
The Bill of Rights
65. What is a minimum voting age in the United States?
Eighteen (18)
66. Who signs bills into law?
The President
67. What is the highest court in the United States?
The Supreme Court
68. Who was the President during the Civil War?
Abraham Lincoln
69. What did the Emancipation Declaration do?
Freed many slaves
70. What special group advises the President?
The Cabinet
71. Which President is called the “Father of our country”?
George Washington
72. What Immigration and Naturalization Service form is
used to apply to become a naturalized citizen?
Form N-400, Application to File Petition for Naturalization
73. Who helped the Pilgrims in America?
The American-Indians (Native Americans)
74. What is the name of the ship that brought the Pilgrims to
America?
The Mayflower
75. What are the 13 original states of the U.S. called?
Colonies
76. Name 3 rights of freedom guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.
The right of freedom of speech, press, religion, peaceable
assembly, and requesting change of government.
The right to bear arms (the right to have weapons or own a gun,
though subject to certain regulations).
The government may not quarter, or house, soldiers in the
people’s homes during peacetime without the people’s consent.
The government may not search or take a person’s property
without a warrant.
A person may not be tried twice for the same crime and does
not have to testify against him/herself.
A person charged with a crime still has some rights, such as the
right to a trial and to have a lawyer. The right to trial by jury in

most cases.
Protects people against excessive or unreasonable fines or
cruel and unusual punishment.
The people have rights other than those mentioned in the
Constitution.
Any power not given to the federal government by the
Constitution is a power of either the state or the people.
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77. Who has the power to declare the war?
The Congress
78. What kind of government does the United States
have?
Democracy
79. Which President freed the slaves?
Abraham Lincoln
80. In what year was the Constitution written?
1787
81. What are the first 10 amendments to the Constitution
called?
The Bill of Rights
82. Name one purpose of the United Nations?
For countries to discuss and try to resolve world problems,
to provide economic aid to many countries.
83. Where does Congress meet?
In the Capitol in Washington, D.C.
84. Whose rights are guaranteed by the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights?
Everyone (citizens and non-citizens) living in U.S.
85. What is the introduction to the Constitution called?
The Preamble
86. Name one benefit of being citizen of the United
States.
Obtain federal government jobs, travel with U.S. passport,
petition for close relatives to come to the U.S. to live.
87. What is the most important right granted to U.S.
citizens?
The right to vote
88. What is the United States Capitol?
The place where Congress meets
89. What is the White House?
The President’s official home
90. Where is the White House located?
Washington, D.C. (1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.)
91. What is the name of the President’s official home?
The White House
92. Name the right guaranteed by the first amendment.
Freedom of: speech, press, religion, peaceable assembly, and
requesting change of the government.
93. Who is the Commander in Chief of the U.S. military?
The President
94. Which President was the first Commander in Chief
of the U.S. military?
George Washington
95. In what month do we vote for the President?
November
96. In what month is the new President inaugurated?
January
97. How many times may a Senator be re-elected?
There is no limit
98. How many times may a Congressman be re-elected?
There is no limit
99. What are the 2 major political parties in the U.S.
today?
Democratic and Republican
100. How many states are there in the United States
today?
Fifty (50)

APPENDIX C
“Semi-structured Interview Questions
for Court Interpreters, Attorneys, Legal Advocates”
1. How would you describe your role as _____________?

2. Why do you volunteer/work here?
3. Do you ever work specifically with ESL or low English proficiency clients

here?
-If approached by a client with such a need, how would you advise them to go
forward…?
4. Do you know how clients with language needs go about receiving translation
and interpretation services in the court system?
5. Generally, what kinds of cases require translation and interpretation?
6. Have you had any experiences with people expressing difficulties or concerns
with respect to accessing translation/interpretation services? Please describe
some of the concerns you have heard…
7. What are some other difficulties you see in terms of access to the law?
8. Please discuss your own views on access to these services.
-Basically, does the system meet the needs? Why or why not?
-Access to legal knowledge?
9. In your experience, how does this figure into the actual court proceedings?

10. In your view, what role do translation and interpretation (and difficulties of
access) play in the Lexington judicial system?
-Does this create different outcomes?
-Does this advantage or disadvantage certain people?
-Does this system create ‘justice’… what does this mean?
11. Have you seen an increase in the types of cases, or in clientele requiring these
types of services? Why do you think that is?
12. Is translation/interpretation of the law a matter only of language barriers?

What about ‘cultural translation’?
13. Do your experiences give you any insight into what it means to be an
immigrant in Lexington? What are the linkages, if any, between immigration
and criminality?
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APPENDIX D
“Excerpt from Interview Transcript”
K: Do you have any knowledge of how, outside of MSLC, those with either language
issues or status issues go about ‘navigating’ the legal system? That is, have you heard
any stories about people expressing frustrations?
R1: Yeah, well, that’s a good question. Um, there are people in the past, and probably
still doing it now, who will offer themselves- both Spanish-speaking and Englishspeaking people, who will offer immigration services without being qualified to provide
those services. They end up taking peoples’ money and really sc… messing up their
situation in a lot of cases by either filing forms that they shouldn’t be filing because
people are not eligible and they don’t know what they’re doing, and what they really
want to do is collect the money, that’s what they’re interested in, and we’ve had a number
of examples of those, and people have really gotten messed up by what… what
somebody- they call themselves “notaries”, and in Latin America “notary” is frequently
an attorney. And, of course, here, that’s not the case. They call themselves “notarios”,
and they offer these services, and people- not knowing any better- will pay these folks a
lot of money, in some cases a few thousand dollars, to provide a service that they are not
qualified to provide, and, eventually these people disappear, but in the meantime, they’ve
left in their wake, a lot of… problems… for those clients. Yeah, so that’s one way they
do it; it’s just unfortunate.
And, even in some… I hate to say it… I’ve seen one or two cases of attorneys who
provide services that they shouldn’t be providing. It’s like us trying to do criminal
defense work; we’re not qualified to do it. And, in Kentucky, under Kentucky law, we
don’t specialize- lawyers do not specialize- they don’t recognize areas of law that are
specialties, which is the case in some other places. So, with a few exceptions like
Admiralty Law, which is some… weird kind of law. In other words, you can’t say that
you are certified in criminal law in Kentucky because, eh, they don’t certify, but it
happens, just as a matter of necessity, people focus on one area or two, or however many
they feel comfortable with, but Immigration Law is a really complex area of the Law,
and, if you’re not well-grounded in it, you can lose your way real quickly… But, there’s
an ethics. The real problem is these notarios; they are a serious problem, and, even if
they don’t call themselves “notaries”, there are some American-born people…
K: Are you aware how one goes about finding one of these “notarios”?
R1: It’s just word of mouth… And, by the way, this is not a problem that is unique to
Lexington or Kentucky; it’s nation-wide. And, if you go out West in the heavily Latin
areas like California and so on, the problem’s really severe in those areas. And probably
not very many people offering services of the type we’re offering… Now this is pure
speculation: I’m guessing that that fact that we’ve been open for so long and people have
gotten to know us that there is less of that… opportunity for notarios and other people
who don’t know what they’re doing who, uh, take advantage of folks. But, in other
places, where there’s large numbers of immigrants, it’s likely not to be the case; they still
operate.
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